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 In the aftermath of the Cold War, the European Community (EC)/ European 
Union (EU) and Russia went through significant processes of change internally and 
in their mutual relations.  While redefining themselves, these two major actors of the 
continent also got an opportunity to change their heritage of mutual confrontation.  
To this end, they have chosen to intensify their economic relations through 
consultation, institutionalization, and an increase in economic activities such as trade 
and credits. The wide scope and political motivation behind this rapprochement 
encouraged this relationship to turn into economic interdependence.  
 
Economic interdependence in Russian-EU relations serves a political end. 
Parties, both devoid of adequate military capacities, try to change their historical 
perceptions about each other and realize their own economic and political goals 
through this relationship. The EU countries want to secure their involvements in 
Russian economy, mitigate the effects of eastwards enlargement on Russia, and 
incorporate Russia firmly in the European system so that it will not threaten Europe 
in the future. As EU countries become more involved in Russia’s development, they 
also become more vulnerable to shifts in Russian policies. As for Russia, it wants to 
be recognized as a Great Power, and to this end to achieve economic development, 
and to breach the encirclement it feels due to the dual expansions of the EU and 
NATO.  
 
 This work aims to examine the nature of economic interdependence between 
Russia and the EU, and the latter’s role in easing the historically tense relations.  






Soğuk Savaş’ın ertesinde, Avrupa Topluluğu (AT)/Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve Rusya, içişlerinde 
ve ikili ilişkilerinde önemli değişim süreçlerinden geçtiler. Kıtanın başlıca iki aktörü kendilerini 
yeniden tanımlarken, mücadeleye dayalı ortak geçmişlerini de değiştirme olanağı buldular. Bu amaçla, 
danışma, kurumsallaşma, ve ticaret, kredi gibi ekonomik etkinliklerini arttırma yoluyla ilişkilerini 
yoğunlaştırmayı seçtiler. Bu yakınlaşmanın ardındaki geniş bakış açısı ve siyasal dürtü bu ilişkinin 
ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılığa dönüşmesini sağladı. 
  
Rusya-AB ilişkilerindeki ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılık siyasal bir amaca hizmet etmektedir. 
Yeterli askeri olanaklardan yoksun olan iki taraf da birbirleri hakkındaki tarihsel algılamalarını 
değiştirmeye çabalamakta ve bu ilişki yoluyla kendi ekonomik ve siyasal amaçlarını gerçekleştirmeye 
çalışmaktadırlar. AB ülkeleri Rusya ekonomisindeki yerlerini sağlamlaştırmayı, doğuya genişlemenin 
Rusya üzerindeki etkilerini yumuşatmayı ve Rusya’yı gelecekte kıtayı tehdit etmeyecek biçimde 
Avrupa sistemine bütünleştürmeyi istemektedirler. AB ülkeleri Rusya’nın gelişimine karıştıkça, 
Rusya’nın siyasal değişimlerine daha da duyarlı hale gelmektedirler. Rusya ise, Büyük Güç olarak 
tanımlanmayı arzulamakta ve bu amaçla ekonomik gelişme sağlamak ve AB ile NATO’nun genişlmesi 
sonrasında sıkıştığını hissettiği çemberi kırmak istemektedir. 
 
İşbu çalışma, Rusya ile AB arasındaki ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılık ilişkisinin doğasını ve 
bunun tarihten gelen gergin ilişkilerin yumuşamasındaki rolünü incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.  
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 The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the nature of economic 
and security relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union. 
Motivation behind the preparation of this paper is not mere academic curiosity, but 
rather the intuition that configuration of the Russian-EU relations has the power to 
reshape the macro-political structure of the world. This intuition stems from two 
significant aspects of common historical knowledge: First and foremost, Europe, 
considering all its definitions1, has been both the major stage and actor of world 
history. Either through paths of civilization and culture or of war, discovery and 
revolution, Europe fundamentally affected the current of history. Secondly, in 
contemporary history, both Western Europe and Russia went through peculiar 
processes of change. Combining these two historical  data may illuminate the 
medium-term developments, which will affect the definition of Russian-Western 
European relationship. The decisive question is whether the construction of a 
security community in Europe is possible. The answer to this question will not only 
have impact on the actors or their spheres of influence, but also -as a model- on 
world politics. 
 Since this paper is an introductory study on the reflection of emerging 
                                                          
1 ‘Europe’ may be defined in geographical, cultural or political terms. Geographically, the 
Mediterranean separates Europe from Africa. In the West, the rocks of Gibraltar and Ceuta indicate the 
start of the ocean. Yet, eastern borders of Europe are not that clear. It seems still vague whether Europe 
ends with the Sea of Azov and the River Don or includes the Urals. After the initiation of the EU 
enlargement, southeastern Europe, Turkey and Cyprus also became the components of the 
geographical puzzle. Culturally, Europe is identified with Christendom, the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment. Politically, Europe is referred as the cradle of political liberty. All these dimensions of 
the idea of ‘Europe’ are intertwined with each other. For a comprehensive elaboration, see Kevin 
Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, ed. The History of the Idea of Europe, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995) 
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Russian-EU partnership on macro-politics, it seems crucial to draw the intellectual 
framework cautiously.  
  The demise of the Cold War stimulated fundamental change for the major 
political entities of Europe. Both the Russian Federation2 and the European Union3 
(EU) went through peculiar politico-social experiences: 1) Russia, as the formal heir 
to the Soviet Empire, shrank into a medium-power, which ‘unusually’ enjoy nuclear 
weapons; 2) the EC introduced a new phenomenon to the world politics, namely a 
‘supranational’ state. Major actors of the continent, once sharing a severe rivalry, 
found themselves on a stage of uncertain, undefined relations. They both carried the 
legacy of confrontation and faced with an opportunity to change that heritage in the 
Post-Cold War era. 
 The above characterization of the parties presents a methodological 
constraint, namely a level of analysis problem. This difficulty, created by the nature 
of the subject political entities, needs to be clarified beforehand. Russia, bearing in 
mind its federative structure, is a nation-state, whereas the EU, composed of several 
sovereign states, does not fit to the traditional definition of the state. Thus, equating 
these two actors at different levels of analysis may seem odd to the reader. The 
specific path to overcome this challenging methodological question will be a 
practical one: The EU will be treated as a unitary actor as far as the member states’ 
attitudes towards the  ‘Russian factor’ converge. Yet, bilateral relations between 
Russia and specific member states will be explained when it seems necessary. 
Another methodological difficulty stems from the immaturity of the Russian-
EU relations. The relationship has been recently institutionalized and is still an 
                                                          
2 The term ‘Russia’ will be used instead of the Russian Federation throughout this essay. 
3 The European Community (EC) was renamed as the European Union (EU) in 1993, when the 1991 
Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the EU-TEU) went into force. 
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ongoing process. That is why there is a limited number of publications on the subject 
matter. Hence, in some parts, analyses of the author on certain historical events or 
political statements can be considered as ‘over-interpretation’.  
 
A) VARIABLES CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONSHIP 
 In order to elaborate on the Russian-EU relations, first the variables affecting 
the relationship should be determined and described. Basically, there are four such 
variables concerning the Russian-EU case: 1) identity, 2) presence/absence of 
ideological confrontation, 3) balance of economic and military power, 4) economic 
interdependence. In this chapter, the author will briefly explain the above-mentioned 
variables, explicate the theoretical and practical reasons of choosing the ‘economic 
interdependence,’ and depict the historical background of contemporary Russian-EU 
relations.  
 Identity formation is one of the determining factors which moulds foreign 
policy perceptions of the states. There are two main approaches on national identity 
formation of the modern state: essentialism and constructivism.4  Briefly, the first 
approach argues that “the political identities flow more or less directly from the 
underlying cultural ‘raw material’” whereas the second one sees the link between 
identity and culture insignificant.5 Thus, essentialists argue that the identity is bound 
to the cultural heritage and it is more or less impossible to manipulate the process. 
On the other hand, constructivists regard active manipulation of the process possible 
and stress the inherent ‘artificiality’ of the identity formation. Above these 
approaches, there stands another argument, which stresses the relational character of 
                                                          
4 Lars-Erik Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” edited in L. E. Cederman 
Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 
p. 10 
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the identity.6 Accordingly, “the integration of a human collective necessarily 
involves the exclusion of non-members.”7 Thus, creation and articulation of an ‘us’ 
identity directly brings into existence the ‘them’ or the ‘other’ by drawing actual 
borders or just by rhetoric.  
 All three arguments, mentioned very briefly, have something relevant for 
identities of the EU and Russia. For instance, from the viewpoint of the essentialists, 
formation of a supra-national European identity relies upon the natural development 
of all-encompassing European culture. That will probably mean the evaporation of 
individual national identities. On the other hand, from the constructivist perspective, 
it is possible to form a European identity by using politics and ideology. Through 
either historical or manipulative path, European identity will be formed by borders 
the EU draws and by the character of the ‘other.’8 European Union needs an identity 
to legitimize itself and to constitute a common perspective on foreign policy 
problems. The EU may complete its integration and achieve the final goal of 
European oneness only if it puts a coherent supra-national identity in front of the 
world powers.  
 On the other hand, Russia -being a nation-state- has an identity, yet debate 
rises on where that identity belongs. There is an immense literature on Russian 
identity crisis:  Is Russia European? Asiatic? Or both? Does Russia constitute a 
distinctive identity or present an ‘anomaly’?9 The core of this debate is the duality in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Ibid. 
6 Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus,” edited 
in L. E. Cederman Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), p. 142 
7 Ibid., p. 143 
8 For an example of the debate on the European identity, please see Stanley Hoffmann, “The 
European Union: One Body, Many Voices,” Current, Issue 365, September 1994, pp. 34-45. 
9 For the examples of this literature, please see Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A 
study in identity and international relations, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995); Neil Malcolm, 
ed., Russia and Europe: An end to confrontation?, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), ; Paul Dukes, 
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Russian aspirations on its own identity: Russia both wants to be included within 
Europe as an equal partner and simultaneously be a superior, separate entity. Both 
aspirations are historically rooted and  composed of several elements, such as 
geography, religion, state system. Russia has always been ‘different’ from the rest of 
Europe and been regarded as a pupil in some stage of perpetual transition to 
Europeanization.10 However, the Russian duality hampers the completion of this 
process by creating a cycle: “Any regular attack of the Western virus and the 
resultant spiritual ‘thaw’ were followed by a regular ‘freeze,’ invariably 
accompanied by outbreaks of patriotic xenophobia, struggles against foreign 
influence, and state expansionism.”11 In sum, Russia is incapable of ending this 
dilemma either by giving up one of its ambitions or considering its position as an 
advantage. As one author puts it forward, “the Russian project cannot gain a decisive 
victory - hence the aim is to make sure that whatever kind of Europeanization 
emerges there will be a place for Russia in the new world.”12 On the  other hand, the 
EU will either complete its enlargement process and draw its final boundary by 
pointing out Russia as the ‘other’ or give up a ‘solid’ identity and break the cycle by 
somehow incorporating Russia. Thus, both Russian and European identities will 
affect the relationship. 
 Another crucial determinant in this relationship is the presence or absence of 
ideological confrontation, precisely, whether Russia and European countries 
advocate for the same way of life or not. In order to exemplify this basic variable, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ed., Russia and Europe, (London: Collins & Brown, 1991); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of 
the West, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Gerhard Simon, “Political Culture in Russia,” 
Aussenpolitik, III/1995, pp. 242-253. 
10 Iver B. Neumann, op. cit., p. 159 
11 G. Derlyugan, “Was Russia ever a colonial empire?”, International Affairs (Moscow), 1991, no. 3,  
p. 87 cited in Neil Malcolm, “Introduction: Russia and Europe” edited in Neil Malcolm Russia and 
Europe: An end to confrontation?, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p. 3 
12 Ole Waever, “Europe since 1945: crisis to renewal,” edited by Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen 
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one may think of 1815 Holy Alliance, initiated by Alexander I and the Cold War 
period. After the Napoleonic wars, what brought Russia, Prussia and Austria 
together under the Holy Alliance was the common enemy threatening the autocratic 
‘ancién regimes,’ that is to say the traditional way these states survive. Likewise, 
during the Cold War years, what divided Europe above all was the ideological 
difference. To oversimplify the subject matter, the two hostile camps were the group 
of states, which chose or were impelled to choose one distinct way of life: either 
liberal democracy and capitalist economy or ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and 
communist economic rules. Obviously, it became possible to mention Russian-EU 
partnership whenever ideological confrontation became obsolete. For instance, as it 
will be discussed in the historical background part, the Soviet Union was inclined to 
perceive the  European integration as “the political and economic arm of NATO and 
an imperialist means against the Third World and the working class.”13 Briefly, 
ideological bases, on which the parties’ economic and political systems are built, 
constitute a decisive element of contemporary Russian-EU relations. Since these 
bases converge today, even in rhetoric, easement of relations is more likely than 
ever.14 
 Third major variable of the Russian-EU relationship is the balance between 
the economic and military capabilities of the parties. Since without a considerable 
level of capability, it is impossible to realize any foreign policy intention, parity or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in The History of the Idea of Europe, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 187 
13 H. Seeler, “The Contribution of the European Parliament Towards the Development of the Relations 
Between Western and Eastern Europe,” edited in Marc Maresceau The Political and Legal Framework 
of Trade Relations Between the European Community and Eastern Europe, (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989) p. 106 cited in Esra Hatipoğlu, “Rusya-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri” Marmara 
Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, vol. 9, no. 1, 2001, p. 116     
14 For instance, the main agreement between Russia and the EU, the Partnership Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) of 1994, refers to the promotion of economic principles of the market economy and 
Russian democratic reforms as the main objectives. Thus, signatures on this agreement refer to the  
extermination of ideological confrontation and merger under the rule of a single ideology.  
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disparity in power schemes will impact the perceptions of the parties. That is to say, 
parties would have given up their ambitions, if they were rational actors and knew 
the deficiency of their comparative power. Relevancy of this argument may seem  
equivocal, since it is difficult to foresee the intentions of a nation-state. Yet, it is a 
clear-cut fact that European countries have strengthened their economic positions 
through integration and common market principles, moreover are still being 
protected under the security umbrella of NATO. Relatively, Russian Federation is at 
a vulnerable stage of its development. The Federation inherited worn-out military 
assets and a malfunctioning economic system from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
at the beginning of the decade, Russia had to reformulate its foreign policy and 
realize the expected reforms with the cadres, again inherited from the communist 
rule. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the only ‘great power’ capacity, remained at 
the hands of Russia, was the arsenal of nuclear weapons. As a result of this power 
gap, it became difficult for Russia to have a say on international conflicts like the 
one in Kosovo or remain firm without external aids. Consequently, again as a 
rational actor, Russia’s best option seems to be a balanced, cautious foreign policy, 
which paves way to closer ties with the West. 
 As can be seen, the list of variables affecting the Russian-EU relationship 
may be lengthened. However, all the variables, except one, will be results of 
historical events or natural processes, immune from human control. That exception, 
on which conscious manipulation is possible is the economic interdependence. 
Policy-makers, analysts, statesmen or scholars cannot directly change the identity 
set-ups, ideological shifts or depth of the capabilities gap. Nevertheless, it is 
relatively easier to manipulate the economic relations through paths of 
institutionalization, dialogue, regular consultation, and promotion of  common 
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projects. That is to say, maturation of economic links to an ‘interdependent’ level 
may be more effective on total betterment of relations than the impacts of the other 
variables.15 This is the exact reason why this variable is chosen for this study instead 
of the others.  
 
B) THEORETICAL BASIS  
As far as the theoretical basis for the above approach is considered, there are 
two opposite standpoints: liberal and realist schools.16  Economic interdependence is 
interpreted in different ways with regard to its results: liberals see bilateral economic 
interdependence as a causal factor diminishing incentives for conflict, whereas 
realists see either provoking effects of interdependence or no relevance for peace at 
all. The realist paradigm’s premises are clear-cut: 1) Nation-states are the main 
actors of international politics (state-centric perspective); 2) Domestic and 
international spheres of operation are separate from each other; 3) States survive in a 
single world of “repetitive competition for the single stake of power.”17 
Contemporary advocates of realism, like Kenneth Waltz and Joseph M. Grieco make 
further contributions to the understanding of the paradigm by stating that nation-
states are interest-oriented, rational and unitary actors operating under anarchical 
conditions, namely “absence of a reliable central authority.”18 These premises 
                                                          
15 Apparently, rapprochement through economic interdependence is not a new catalyst for 
confrontational relations. For instance, one of the motives of the idea of European integration was to 
solve the long-standing Franco-German antagonism and it is not a coincidence to give priority to the 
construction of economic partnership.  
16 In various sources of International Relations (IR) literature, these schools of thought may be 
referred with different names. Moreover, the same theoretical traditions have been brought up as 
liberal institutionalism or neo-realism in the Post-Cold War era. Since the main tenets are the same 
under different designations, in this essay, ‘liberalism’ and ‘realism’ will be used.  
17 Richard W. Mansbach, “The Realist Ride Again: Counterrevolution in International Relations,” 
edited in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics 
(Alderhot: Avebury, 1989), p. 221 
18 For sources on classical realism, please see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) and Hans 
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explain why “states are by definition self-help agents”19: 
 (...) to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a 
condition of anarchy - be they people, corporations, states, or whatever - 
must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can 
make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an 
anarchic order.20 
  
 Under realist conditions, interdependence appears to be an unfavourable 
position, since it threatens the basics of international politics. Realist opposition 
relies on two points:  
y Increasing dependence of individual states “on goods produced in other states” 
and “loss of autonomy in economic decision-making” constitute sources of 
insecurity for nation-states.21 Since market forces increase the vulnerability of 
states and decrease their control over international trade, investment, and 
finance; states get devoid of means for maintaining the self-help system and 
become totally unprotected.22 
y In realist terms, “states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore 
[...] states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain 
more from cooperation than they do.”23 Thus, contrary to the liberal thinking, 
states do not satisfy with absolute gains and do concern about the relative ones. 
  
 In sum, according to the realist school, interdependence increases 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). For the quotation, see 
Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Relations Theory and the Study of International Politics,” 
edited in M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry New Thinking in International Relations Theory, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 164   
19 Ibid., p. 165 
20 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 111 
21 Beverly Crawford, “The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence,” 
Millennium, vol. 23, no. 1 (1994), p. 27 
22 Ibid., p. 29 
23 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and The Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of The Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 487 
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uncertainty, brings about extreme forms of inequality to the already anarchical 
international system, and creates a world more prone to conflict.  
 On the other hand, liberal approach  towards economic interdependence has 
been constructed with different voices and explanations. For instance, 17th century 
intellectual Eméric Crucé argued that wars break out because of  misunderstandings 
and the interests of warrior classes, and may be reduced by expanding commerce.24 
Accordingly, “trade create[s] common interests, increase[s] prosperity and political 
power of the peaceful, productive members of society.”25 Whereas Crucé binds the 
expansion of commerce and ending of wars to the development of the bourgeoisie, 
Immanuel Kant relies on human inclinations to support his intuition for prevalence 
of “financial power.”26 The core of this interpretation is that economic 
interdependence is one of the legs of a tripod -together with democracy (republican-
constitutional government) and international law- constituting the conditions for 
Perpetual Peace.27 Accordingly, economic interdependence promotes peace not 
because of its inherent virtues, but because of the constraints these legs impose on 
the domestic and international mechanisms. An adherent of Kant, Norman Angell, 
emphasized the mutual interests of the states in economic cooperation and argued 
that economic frontiers of a state may go well beyond its political frontiers and 
damaging others’ markets means loss of potential or exact consumption markets, 
reduction of market competition, and crumbling of the whole economic wheel.28 
                                                          
24 John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict: 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 2 (June 
1997), p. 268 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hans Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1795] 1991), 
p. 114. 
27 Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal,  and David R. Davis, “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: 
International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85,” International Organization, vol. 52, 
no. 3 (Summer 1998), p. 441 
28 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion - Now, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1938), p. 264 cited in 
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Angell underlines the realistic traits in his argument by stating that “war will not stop 
itself apart from human endeavour, man can, since he makes war, also make wars to 
cease.”29 From a different viewpoint, for instance, in writings of Karl W. Deutsch,  it 
is claimed that “trade and other forms of intercultural exchange would help foster the 
development of a ‘sense of community,’ which makes the resort to violent forms of 
conflict resolution increasingly unlikely.”30  
 As some of them are summarized above, there is a wide literature on how 
interdependence functions to establish peace. Moreover, there are some authors 
using game-theoretic approaches or introducing new concepts to the equation.31  
However, the gist of liberal arguments are similar: through one way or other, 
economic interdependence removes the use of force out of the pool of policy options 
and promotes solution of disagreements with non-militaristic means, such as 
mediation. That is to say, growing economic interdependence increases the security 
enjoyed by the parties by making the use of coercion unlikely. On the other hand, 
realist school argues that economic interdependence is either ineffective on security 
concerns or conditionally bound to the security factor. Thus, states cannot build 
‘friendly’ relations through the other way around, and should first guarantee a certain 
level of security.  
 Both theories are relevant to the Russian-EU case: A realist may argue that 
Russian-EU economic partnership is stemmed from removal of the security threats 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Jaap de Wilde, “Norman Angell: Ancestor of Interdependence Theory,” edited in James N. Rosenau 
and Hylke Tromp Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), pp. 
17-20. 
29 Ibid., p. 23  
30 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957) cited in Katherine Barbieri  and Gerald Schneider, “Globalization and Peace: Assessing 
New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 4 (July 
1999), pp. 388-389 
31 For example, Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” International Security, vol. 
20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41 or R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining 
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and cannot build a ‘security community’ in Europe without giving priority to 
security concerns. Yet, a liberal would say that economic interdependence between 
Russia and the EU has the capacity to change the destiny of the continent and  
dismantle the clashes of interests forever. This study is written to question the 
likelihood of this liberal premise because of two reasons: first, subject matter makes 
reference to the very raison d’étre of the discipline, namely to search for reasons of 
war and prospects for lasting peace. Contrary to the realist perspective, which seems 
to justify the reality, liberal viewpoint formulates a new hypothesis, valid or not, but 
worth to investigate. Second, even though economic interdependence is proved to be 
unsuccessful in totally changing security perceptions, effects of economic concerns 
on realpolitik should be examined in order to constitute a model for other bilateral 
relationships, identified with long-standing, historical confrontation.  
 
C) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 In order to present a complete account of contemporary Russian-EU 
relations, it is necessary to give a brief historical background. During the Cold War, 
Soviet attitude towards the European Economic Community (EEC) and the idea of 
European integration was under the heavy influence of the Marxist-Leninist  
ideology. According to the communist way of thinking, “the notion of capitalist 
powers cooperating in a sustained way to serve enlightened economic interest was 
quite alien.”32 Thus, until the 1970s, the Soviet Union regarded the EEC/EC as an 
“anti-Soviet ploy initiated in Washington.”33 Yet, “in opposing West European 
integration, the USSR traditionally followed a dual approach: on the one hand it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Power, and Political Influence,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-
483. 
32 Neil Malcolm, op. cit., 10 
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criticized the Community for its inward and exclusive character, while on the other it 
proposed all-European or global alternatives to it.”34  
 Generally, there are four points highlighting the Soviet standpoint in the Cold 
War years:  
1. The Soviet Union underestimated the European Community and did not take it 
seriously for a long time. 
2. USSR’s negative attitude towards the EC stemmed from the perception that 
integration in Western Europe would probably have a military dimension, 
excluding the Soviet territories. For instance, USSR attached no importance to 
the Schuman Plan, whereas it definitely reacted against the constituent agreement 
of the European Defense Community (EDC).35  
3. The Soviet Union intended to link the EC with Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), East European economic cooperation institution and tried to 
gain official recognition for CMEA and Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Yet, 
these hopes were difficult to realize under the shadow of the Cold War. 
4. Soviet underestimation of the EC ended when the EC began to emerge as a third 
political power in the bilateral system. In 1970s, as the friction within the 
Transatlantic Alliance arose, the Soviet Union began to attach importance to the 
Community.36 
With regard to the European attitude towards the Soviet Union, there is 
vagueness, caused by the nature of the Cold War. Between two hostile blocs, with its 
economic outlook, EC was not playing one of the vital roles in the game. In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
33 Ibid., p. 11 
34 John van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 275    
35 A. Smith and H. Wallace, “The European Union: Towards A Policy For Europe,” International 
Affairs, vol. 70, no. 3, 1994, p. 430-432 cited by Esra Hatipoglu, op. cit., p. 121 
36 Neil Malcolm, op. cit., p. 11 
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immediate danger of a nuclear war on Western European territory turned it into a 
luxury to have a voice separate from the US’. Nevertheless, an exceptional period had 
been experienced in Europe, namely Detenté. In fact, Detenté was rather a process 
with several steps:37 first step was the conclusion of commercial agreements between 
USSR and individual Western European countries in 1950s. Later, parties also signed 
scientific and technological exchange agreements. “In the late 1960s, permanent 
economic institutions, such as the joint commissions, were established,” and by the 
early 1970s, the volume of economic relations reached to the level of “economic and 
industrial cooperation.”38 However, efforts to make detenté “irreversible” and “to 
supplement political and military detenté” had failed due to a couple of reasons.39 First 
and foremost, increases in the price of energy, which used to be lower, and recession 
in Western Europe negatively affected the trade volume. Secondly, friction on the 
security issues, for instance NATO’s decision to launch the Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Missiles (INF) on the continent or Soviet war in Afghanistan, revitalized the 
Cold War spirit.40 That is to say, Detenté, with regard to its importance as an early 
trial of interdependent peace, failed to meet the expectations of liberal school. As 
realists truly estimated, security concerns were not overcome by economic 
interdependence. 
With regard to institutional relations, USSR signed its first trade and 
economic cooperation agreement with the EC in December 1989.41 This treaty also 
represents the official Soviet recognition given to the EC. Yet, efforts to develop the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
37 John van Oudenaren, op. cit., p. 271-273 
38 Ibid. (emphasis added to stress author’s point. Author means that level of commercial relations 
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39 Ibid., p. 348 
40 Ibid, p. 350-351 
41 Perdita Fraser, “Russia, the CIS and the European Community: Building a Relationship” edited in 
Neil Malcolm Russia and Europe: An end to confrontation?, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p. 200 
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relations beyond the framework drawn by this agreement were interrupted by the 
stormy years of 1989-1991. By the end of the year 1991, the Soviet Union was 
‘peacefully’ dismantled, while the European Community was preparing itself for a 
closer union.  To this end, the European Community (EC) decided to employ common 
monetary, economic and foreign/security policies at the December 1991 Maastricht 
Summit, namely the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP).42 Besides this improvement towards deepening, the EC gave 
the signals for enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. However, ambitious 
objectives of the Community resulted in disagreements about the fundamentals of the 
ongoing change. Since this move of the Community challenged the sovereign nature 
of the European states, they preferred either to opt out from certain provisions of the 
treaty, for instance, the target of establishing a single currency, or to interpret the 
Maastricht Treaty as the tenet of a “looser bloc”.43 
 On the Russian side, domestic and foreign policies were being reformulated 
under the governance of President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrey 
Kozyrev. This period was especially important because of the Atlanticism-
Eurasianism discussion.44 Being rooted in the historical identity of Russia, some 
advocated closer ties with Europe while others put their country on a different stage 
by emphasizing its uniqueness against Europe, respectively. These two standpoints 
also adopted their own policy implications, that is to say, either collaboration with the 
West45 as a European power or decoupling from Europe. Especially “the first two 
years of the Yeltsin government were characterized by a foreign policy, [in which] the 
                                                          
42 Richard L. Kugler. (1996) Enlarging NATO: The Russian Factor. RAND: Santa Monica, pp. 1-3. 
43 Ibid., p. 2. 
44 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 292-
293. 
45 ‘West’ is referred to the Western Europe (presented by the EC/EU) and the US. 
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development of closer relations with the West dominated everything else.”46  It was 
the Post-Cold War euphoria in Europe, which triggered the idea of building up a pan-
European security structure. For the Russians, the best option for that mission was the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which would 
counterbalance the power of the U.S. within NATO. Besides such security 
organizations, the Russian governors did not attribute much significance and primacy 
to the European Community, emerging in a new format with its security means. Thus, 
Russia focused on the future commitments of NATO and the alternative role of the 
CSCE.47 Even in terms of economic relations, Russia-EC trade did not constitute a 
shining instance; moreover, Russia was being indebted to individual countries, like 
the US or Germany 48 instead of the EC.  
 In December 1993, the Russian Federation elected a new State Duma and 
ratified the new Constitution. Beforehand in November, the 1993 Military Doctrine 
was initiated. In this document, although Russia expressed that “no country is 
regarded as an adversary”, it determined its vital interests by equalizing its own 
security to that of the Near Abroad (a security belt around Russia composed of the 
Former Republics of the Soviet Union).49 Furthermore, statements of this doctrine 
declare that Russia would defend its vital interests on internal order, borders and 
beyond the country by resorting to the use of military power.  
 Aftermath of this Military Doctrine also marked the beginning of a more 
                                                          
46 Christopher Bluth, Russia and Europe, (Stockholm: FOA Swedish Defence Establishment, January 
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isolationist approach in the Russian foreign policy. This isolationism, stemming from 
the failure of the economic reforms, further undermined the relations between Russia 
and the EC. Meanwhile, the growing turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
especially the war in Bosnia and Croatia, ended the European euphoria and resulted in 
increasing importance and prestige of NATO.  
 In sum, up until the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) in 1994 between the parties, there was no significant attempt to construct 
closer relations. By the year 1994, the Maastricht Treaty was in force and the Russian 
interest towards this new international actor, equipping itself with a security identity, 
was growing. However, those years apart from each other brought about the politico-
social gap between Russia and the EU. Contrary to the economic and political 
development and prosperity enjoyed within the EU, Russia has turned into an 
authoritarian presidential federation with a ruling elite composed of “pragmatists from 
the mid-level nomenclature” and a corrupted, criminalized political system.50 In fact, 
realities of Russia are different from the expectations of the West: Russia, while 
trying to adapt itself to the conditions of the market economy, does not modify any of 
the tenets of the undemocratic political system. Hence, Russia lacks the political and 
legal system for economic development. However, the EU constructs all its policies 
on the economic and political initiatives, which would be taken up by the Russian 
leadership in the future. Finally, this gap and more may be observed in Russia-EU 
relations in the second half of the 1990s. 
 The most significant figure of this period, who further improved the relations, 
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is President Vladimir Putin. Under his governance beginning from 1999, Russian-EU 
relationship entered a new phase. This thesis will focus on the prospects and 
implications of this contemporary era. In order to make an introduction to the new 
macro-political structure of the world, to question the capacity to be a model for other 
confrontational relations and to understand whether it is possible to manipulate 
economic interdependence, this paper will be organized to configure economic and 
security aspects in Russian-EU relations. Comparison of different IR theories on the 
subject matter will not be the main focus of this paper. Yet, realist and liberal 
viewpoints will be helpful to explain some of the notions and perspectives. Bearing in 
mind the motivation and purpose of the paper, the research questions and the 
hypothesis of the whole study is as follows: 
  
y Does Russia constitute a threat for Europe or vice versa? 
y Is it possible to define the economic interactions between Russia and the EU as 
economic interdependence, if yes, to what extent? 
y What is the role of economic interdependence in easing tensions between the 
parties? 
y What are the ‘third variables,’ for instance the role of absence of ideological 
confrontation? 
y Does security factor dominate the Post-Cold War relations between Russia and 
the EU despite the growing economic interdependence  between them?  
  
 In order to construct a meaningful analysis on these research questions, 
throughout this thesis paper, the following hypothesis will be the core: increase in 
economic interdependence stimulates mutual trust, institutionalization of economic 
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partnership, and through dialogue, eases off long-standing threat perceptions and 















A) CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
 As a concept of social sciences, interdependence has a speculative nature 
despite its simple grammatical structure. Reason of this vagueness is the diversity of 
argumentations on the features of interdependence. Precisely, conception of 
interdependence is framed by “objective circumstances that render systems 
dependent to each other and the subjective interpretations of these circumstances.”51 
In order to exemplify these different and “speculative” interpretations, it seems 
relevant to exhibit two central definitions of the notion and determine its most 
pertinent features. 
 Interdependence is defined by Richard Rosecrance as “the direct and positive 
linkage of the interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects 
the position of others and in the same direction.”52 According to this 
conceptualization, interdependence is incapable of changing the policy options or 
decisions of the actors. Interdependence in Rosecrance’s sense is a passive element in 
international affairs. His version stresses the feature of mutual benefit and weakly 
refers to decisive influence of interdependence. That is to say, “interdependence only 
specifies the degree of connectedness between two societies; it does not predict what 
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action will be taken by either of them.”53 Moreover, Rosecrance states that “final 
effect of interdependence among nations is not to choose a course of action for 
statesmen, but to magnify the consequences of the choice that is made.”54 Thus, 
whether it is a true interpretation or not, Rosecrance’s standpoint assumes the 
presence of  interdependence, but playing a minor role in consequences of power 
relations instead of giving direction to them. 
 On the other hand stands Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s definition 
of interdependence, mostly referred in the post-Cold War studies: 
[...] dependence means a state of being determined or significantly 
affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means 
mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries.55  
 
According to Keohane and Nye’s argumentation, the key characteristic of 
interdependence is its reference to asymmetrical relationships.56 That is to say, an 
interdependent relationship in the form of pure symmetry -balanced in terms of costs 
and benefits being posed onto both parties- is difficult to identify. Thus, in practice, 
the spectrum of interdependence ranges from asymmetrical to purely dependent ties 
between parties. Since pure dependence is considered as exploitation, asymmetry is 
the main focus of the authors. What makes asymmetrical interdependence more 
interesting is its capacity to affect the balance of power between the parties rather 
than just magnifying the already existent consequences: 
It is asymmetries in dependence that are likely to provide sources of 
influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent 
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actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power 
in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.57 
  
 Contrary to Rosecrance’s interpretation, Keohane and Nye’s version of 
interdependence is a new focal topic in international relations. Namely, 
interdependence in its asymmetrical form has a concrete impact on foreign policy-
making processes of states. Even the possibility of this premise deserves attention 
and research. Consequently, considering the purposes of this paper expressed in 
Chapter I, Keohane and Nye’s approach is more useful.  
 In sum, economic interdependence in this essay refers to a bilateral 
relationship, which presents varying degrees of costs and benefits to parties by tying 
them to each other. Since this affiliation between the parties are not easily given up, 
unconventional results, in terms of foreign policy-making, can be observed such as 
making a costly choice to preserve the relationship. Hence, in this chapter, economic 
interdependence between Russia and the EU with regard to its power to shape foreign 
policy-making will be explored. 
 In order to operationalize the chosen definition of interdependence, the 
researcher needs to identify those criteria against which it will be examined. For the 
sake of preciseness, list of features are narrowed down to four aspects: institutional 
channels, trade volume, vulnerability, and shared goals of the parties. By 
investigating these features, one may understand the particular nature of 
interdependence between the parties.  
 First characteristic, which turns cooperation or collaboration into 
interdependence, is the establishment of permanent institutional channels between 
the parties. Institutional framework for interdependence is shaped with 
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comprehensive political and economic agreements, regular consultation, and 
cooperation on long-term projects.  
 Second feature is the volume of trade between the parties. However, there are 
different criteria to measure the volume of trade: for example, trade concentration 
(trade with X/total trade volume) or  trade-to-GDP ratio analysis, which gives the 
relative place of trade in that particular state’s economy. Thus, it is crucial to 
evaluate trade volume by giving importance to different sets of data.58  
 Among the selected indicators of interdependence, the most abstract one is 
the third aspect, namely vulnerability, meaning high level of sensitivity of an entity 
to external effects. Interdependence, by definition, entails certain level of 
vulnerability of the parties. Vulnerability in an interdependent relationship simply 
refers to how one of the parties is affected or even transformed as a result of the 
change in the other’s economic policies. For instance, if country A is the biggest 
trade partner of country B or if A is the main energy supplier of B, then a major 
difference in A’s internal politico-economic conditions will influence country B 
sharply. Observation of vulnerability is possible by examining comparative economic 
positions or statements of the statesmen in case of an economic crisis. It is difficult to 
prove the presence of interdependence without  establishing the presence of 
vulnerability. Yet, the matter of concern is to demonstrate the existence of 
vulnerability rather than equality between the levels of vulnerability. 
 The impact of the above-mentioned features are conditionally bound to the 
last characteristic, that is to say, the existence of shared goals. Parties are more 
inclined to build long-term interdependent relations, if they share common goals. 
                                                          




Otherwise, it is difficult to sustain a vulnerable  relationship with all its costs and 
benefits. Significance of the shared goals is also stressed by various authors under 
different names like “trade expectations” or “perception of benefit.”59  
 Factors strengthening economic interdependence may be both political and 
economic interests, shared by the parties. In fact, whether these common interests are 
of economic or political origin and the question of which one comes prior to the other 
are central concerns of this study. In this chapter, character of the economic relations 
will be investigated and the political factors will be left to Chapter III.  
 
B) A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIAN-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
 In order to develop a fully-fledged understanding of contemporary Russian-
EU relations, it is necessary to make a historical analysis. This analysis will try to 
show if and how contemporary economic cooperation between Russia and the EU 
may have been influenced by the past experiences.  
 At the beginning of the 20th century, a huge gap in terms of development was 
observable between Russia and the western European countries. Due to several 
historical reasons, parties had followed different paths, and this divergence shaped 
their respective economic and political systems.  
 In western European countries, the feudal system had grown into a dynamic 
economic order because of technical innovations, population increase, immigration to 
urban areas, and high agricultural productivity.60 These developments stimulated 
commercial and industrial progress, and the creation of a capitalist economic system 
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in due course. Political consequences of western European capitalism was the 
gradual disintegration of the hierarchical order, which became an inadequate system 
for merchants and aristocrats dealing with commerce. In order to protect their 
economic rights, commercial strata of the medieval society asked for political 
liberalization. Hence, capitalist economy and political liberalism have been the 
trademarks of western Europe together with industrial and technological 
improvement. 
 Contrary to the western experience, “in eastern Europe, a different 
evolutionary course prevailed.”61  Immobility of the vast agricultural population 
turned into an agrarian crisis in Russia by combining with other factors. Due to the 
immobility of the man power, industrial working class in Russia grew very slowly. In 
1900, there were one million full-time factory workers, whereas peasant population 
amounted a hundred million, constituting nearly 80 % of the whole Russian society.62 
Industrial development was limited to State factories and small number of factories 
owned by the landowners and carried on by the serf labor. Since purchasing power of 
the serfs was very low and the wealthy had preferred imported luxuries, consumption 
was also inadequate for the development of Russian imperial economy. In sum, being 
devoid of the workforce, know-how, and sufficient markets, Russian economic 
development was malfunctioning. From the political angle, Russia, despite liberal 
attempts after the 1905 Revolution and opening of the Duma, remained as an 
autocratic and centralized country through political censorship and arbitrary police 
rule. Hence, on the eve of the 20th century, Russia was a backward autocratic state 
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with its immense agricultural population and inadequately developed working class. 
 Despite the perpetuation of the Russian economic gap with Europe, relations 
between the parties had flourished in the first decade of the 20th century due to the 
Russian economic progress. After the 1861 Emancipation, increase in agricultural 
productivity and consumption, and rapid industrial development were promoted; 
railway-building projects that stimulated the native iron industry and internal trade, 
got momentum; and in 1897, gold standard was adopted to establish monetary 
stabilization. Consequently, foreign loans, investments and technicians poured into 
the growing Russian economy. From 1892 to 1914, total foreign direct investment, of 
which French and German capital constituted the main portion, reached to one billion 
U. S. dollars (= $ 20 billions in 1995).63 Foreign entrepreneurs decisively contributed 
to the development of the mining and metallurgical centers.64 In order to save their 
investments, foreign businessmen interfered in Russian internal politics to secure 
their positions by giving ultimatums or sanctioning Russian government with higher 
interest rates for loans.65 In accordance with the relative strengths and needs of the 
parties, Russian-west European trade had been shaped in the form of an exchange, in 
which Russia acquired technology transfer and investment, and western European 
countries imported raw materials and energy. For example, France invested in the 
modernization of the Russian oil industry, and in return imported Russian oil at a 
cheaper price compared to the high prices in the world market before 1914.66 
 Nevertheless, growing volume of economic interactions between Russia and 
western Europe was interrupted by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The West refused 
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to recognize the Soviet regime, hence withdrew from all economic activities in 
Russia to protest the measures of the revolution. For example, the Soviet 
government’s repudiation of all obligations of previous Russian administrations in 
January 1918 resulted in a loss of foreign governments and bond holders, equal to 
$6.59 billion (approximately $61 billion in 1990s).67 Moreover, Soviet expropriation 
of private property inflicted heavy losses on foreign enterprise owners (e.g. “French 
investors alone lost $2.8 billion.”68). Therefore, foreign capital, investors and 
technicians, many of which were German, left the country and caused an economic 
decay.69  
 The communist attempt to establish an effective economics distinct from 
capitalism faced with a catastrophic decline because of the civil war and total 
isolation of the Soviet Union from the trading system. Hence, to avoid the absolute 
collapse and to contain the nationwide rebellions, Lenin introduced a tactical retreat 
or “a breathing spell” to the emerging Soviet economy, namely the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). 70 As a part of the NEP, Russia experienced a second phase of 
economic rapprochement with western Europe. In order to rebuild the crumbling 
economy through foreign trade and investment, Lenin gave his consent to the 
normalization of diplomatic ties with the West. First step of this revival was the 
signing of a trade accord with Great Britain in March 1921.71 Following this step, 
trade agreements were signed with other countries, and hesitant European 
businessmen again began to engage in the Russian market.72 Although this revival in 
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Russian-European economic relations contributed to stimulation of the Soviet 
economy, number and essence of this contribution remained limited. By 1928, there 
were thirty-one foreign enterprises in the Soviet Union with a total capital of $16 
million.73 Moreover, most of these investments were directed to Russian natural 
resources rather than the manufacturing sector. From the commercial perspective, the 
Soviet Union achieved to import the most-needed products for its recovery such as 
grain and coal, and later locomotives, farm machinery, electrical equipment.74  That 
is to say, the NEP period, which gradually lost its influence after Lenin’s death in 
1924, was another period of reconciliation in Russian-western European ties. 
However, with the end of this period, Russia returned to a state of isolation both 
because of ideological reasons and exclusion of the West.75    
 Third phase of the Russian-European economic relations was an integral part 
of the detenté between eastern and western blocs in 1970s. Primary motive of the 
detenté was to tie the Soviet Union to the West irreversibly through arms control and 
promotion of trade. Moscow regarded the terms of detenté favorable because of the 
urgent need of the country for technological equipment and grain.76 Yet, being an 
American policy, contribution of the U.S. to detenté remained limited due to the 
restrictive measures taken by the U.S. Congress on trade with the communist bloc.77 
On the other hand, this resolution of the Congress was unable to impede the 
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improvement of the trade between western Europe and the Soviet Union. In fact, 
increase in Western credits to the Soviet Union and erosion of the barriers to Soviet 
energy exports had begun in late 1950s. In 1960s, technological and commercial 
exchange between the parties flourished and institutionalized with bilateral 
cooperation and credit agreements (e.g. in 1964 with Britain, in 1965 with France 
and Italy).78 Among these agreements, the most critical one was the 1970 Moscow 
Treaty with West Germany, which attached great importance to detenté within the 
framework of the Ostpolitik. However, institutionalization of relations and presence 
of various links between the parties such as trade, energy delivery, loan agreements, 
were inadequate devices to tie these totally different economic structures.    
 The last period of  Russian-European rapprochement coincides with the 
Gorbachev period in the Soviet Union beginning in 1985. Under conditions of 
economic stagnation, technological deprivation, scarcity of consumer goods, 
Gorbachev introduced radical economic and administrative reforms. In order to 
increase production and consumption, Moscow began to promote imports from the 
Western bloc and to get loans from foreign creditors to finance these imports. 
Gorbachev’s reforms paved the way for openning of the joint ventures with western 
European partners (e.g. nine German, four Finnish and four Italian firms in 1988).79 
However, heavy external borrowing and use of the hard currency possessions of 
domestic holders could not revive the Soviet economy. As a result, Soviet banks 
became unable to pay to foreign firms. Despite the ‘shock-therapy’ experimented 
under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1990, decline of 
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the Soviet economy perpetuated.80 This rapprochement aimed at supporting the 
Soviet economic reforms left the succeeding Russian Federation a total debt of $77 
billion, of which $60 billion was owed to Western creditors.81  
 In sum, Russia remained out of the range of the economic system prevalent in 
the West. Yet, Russia and western European countries had cooperated economically 
during certain historical periods. Continuity in these periods appears in the form of 
trade composition, in which Russia has been a supplier of raw materials and importer 
of technology and consumer goods. Another point of continuity is the way the 
western European investors have been discouraged by the shifts in economic and 
political policies of Russia. More precisely, European businessmen want to secure 
their investments in Russia through assurance provided by political stability. 
Although time has worked in favor of Russia82 since the collapse of the communist 
rule, there still exist suspicions about the continuation of stability and rule of law in 
Russian Federation. Therefore, European states decided to incorporate Russia into 
the western economic and political system so firmly that their suspicions about the 
future of Russia would be mitigated. This is the political reason for the construction 
of economic interdependence as a control mechanism for Russian economic and 
political attitudes. Accordingly, asymmetrical interdependence will give Europe 
power to influence Russian politics, and bind Russia to Europe with strong links.     
 
                                                          
80  For a full account of those transitional years, please see Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a 
Market Economy? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995);  Anders Aslund, Russia's 
Economic Transformation in the 1990s (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997); R. Sakwa, op. cit., pp. 201-
249. 
81 R. Sakwa, op. cit., p. 209. 
82 Since 1998, Russia began to show signals of recovery. GDP growth in 1999, 2000 and 2001 was 
recorded as 5.4, 9.0, and 5.0 percent respectively. Industrial output increased by 11.0, 11.9, and 4.9 
percent in these years. Yet, this development is generally attributed to favorable conditions in world 
economy such as high oil prices. Keith Bush, The Russian Economy in March 2002 (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 2002), p. 1 
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C) CONTEMPORARY  RUSSIAN-EU ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
 The resolution of the “German problem” has been critical to the positive 
development of Russia’s relations with the West. The approach of both the U.S. and 
the EC/EU to the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation in economic and 
political/security matters essentially flourished on this fundamental new anticipation 
in European politics: that a reunited Germany would be guided both by its national 
leadership and American-European influences that it would no longer pose a threat to 
European and Russian security.  
 
1. EU’s Assessment of Russia    
 Different from the Russian case, there are two actors shaping the European 
economic system: national governments whose economic decisions still diverge 
substantially, and the economic integration process, being accomplished by the EU. 
These two dynamics usually contradict with each other, and are reconciled through 
negotiations. For the case of economic relations with Russia, all member states share 
a common objective, namely integration of a politically stable and economically 
prosperous Russia into European system. This common objective is the main reason 
for the preparation of the first Common Strategy of the EU for Russia in June 1999. 
Furthermore, the EU Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 for the Russian Federation, 
adopted by the Commission in December 2001, was the first of its kind. In this 
document the common objective of the EU members is explained: “the EU has an 
important strategic and economic interest in Russia’s development.”83 More 
precisely, Russia as EU’s future neighbor should be a “prosperous market for EU 
                                                          
83   The European Union, European Commission, External Relations, “Country Strategy Paper 2002-
2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003,” adopted on December 27, 2001, p. 1. PDF Full 
Text, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/csp/index.htm 
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exports and investments and a reliable source of EU energy supplies.”84  
   On the other hand, certain members of the EU are more willing to see Russia 
as an ally than the others. Moreover, these countries use the EU mechanism as an 
instrument to achieve their individual economic and political interests. The principal 
EU country acting as a catalyst in relations with Russia is Germany. Historically, 
Russia and Germany have a similar ambivalence about their national identities. 
Debates on Russian and German Europeanness had revived after the demise of the 
Soviet Union and reunification of Germany, respectively.  Nevertheless, historical 
association of Russia and Germany goes well beyond national identity question. In 
the imperial period, Germany had been an influential country for Russia in terms of 
Russian technological modernization initiated by Germans, intermarriages with the 
German nobility, Russian high government officials primarily composed of Germans, 
and the effects of German political ideas and philosophy on Russian intelligentsia.85 
 From the political angle, two countries also constitute a peculiar relationship. 
Russia has viewed Germany, a country in the center of Europe with no clearly 
defined borders and its growing military and industrial strength, as the main 
challenge to its security.86 Especially after the two expansionist attempts of Germany 
in the 20th century, Russia chose to satisfy its concerns about the “German question” 
by extending its military and ideological control to eastern Europe. Similarly, 
Germany has seen Russia as a threat to Europe due to its proximity to German sphere 
of influence, its size, and the memory of its Cold War domination over east Germany.  
 On the other hand, Germany remained as Russia’s most important economic 
                                                          
84 Ibid. 
85 Walter Laqueur, Russia & Germany: A Century of Conflict, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 
pp. 25-37. 
86 Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, The Soviet Collapse, and the New 
Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 4-5.  
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partner despite their mutual security concerns about each other. Their complementary 
economic relationship has been established upon Russian raw material exports to 
Germany and German supply of manufactures for Russia. There is a historical 
example of Russian-German economic and technical cooperation under the rule of 
Peter The Great, who employed German technicians for modernization of Imperial 
Russia. Even on the eve of the WWII, parties collaborated for their individual 
interests. After the 1922 Rapallo Treaty, Germany opened manufacturing facilities in 
several Russian cities and the Soviet Union supplied assistance for German military 
manoeuvres, forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, on Russian territory.87  
 Germany is the leading country among the other EU countries in economic 
relations with Russia. In bilateral relations, Germany is Russia’s biggest trade partner 
and has the fourth place in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia’s 
economy. Moreover, the debt of the former USSR to the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) amounts to 6.355 billion “transfer rubles”.88 This inherited debt is 
calculated by the Russian officials as $ 1 billion, whereas the Germans insist on their 
own calculation that is equal to six times this sum.    
The EU enlargement towards eastern Europe is totally matching with the 
interests of Germany. Apparently, enlargement will increase German influence 
within the inside mechanism of the Union, especially in the Council. For this end, 
Germany wants the continuation of Russian approval. This may be possible only by 
easing Russian concerns about being sidelined. Hence, Germany gives its full support 
to the establishment of a Common Economic Space (CES), which will link eastwards 
                                                          
87 R. Pipes., op. cit., p. 364. 
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enlargement with Russia.89  
 Although Germany seems to be the main initiator of the Russian-EU 
relationship, there also exists the Northern Dimension (ND), which originally 
referred to the membership of the Nordic countries Finland and Sweden in 1995. In 
September 1997, the ND turned into a proposal for the EU with an objective to form 
a coherent European foreign policy.90 The ND,  as an officially accepted part of the 
Union’s external relations since December 1998 Vienna European Council, aims at 
reducing all dividing lines between the EU, Russia, and the Baltic Sea region through 
‘positive interdependence’.91 Main focus of this initiative is the creation of a non-
provocative way to deal with Russia. Yet, this Finnish initiative has two underlying 
motives: first, mitigating the security dilemma of the Nordic and Baltic countries, and 
Poland through promotion of interdependence; secondly, use of the ND by Finland 
for increasing its repudiation within the Union. That is to say, Finland and to a lesser 
extent Sweden both transferred their security concerns about Russia to the EU, and 
strengthened their role in the Union.  
 Bearing in mind the leading positions of Germany and the Nordic countries, it 
is also crucial for the EU as a whole to construct multi-dimensional relations with 
Russia. Since relations with Russia is a topic on which a general agreement is 
possible, it is relevant to see it as “a tool for EU’s internal purposes, notably for 
giving contents to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).”92   
 On the other hand, economic cooperation with the EU is very important for 
Russia, since this relationship granted the most-desired market economy status to 
                                                          
89 Interview with Bavaria Minister President and CSU leader Edmund Stoiber by Tina Hildebrandt, 
Hamburg Der Spiegel, FBIS-WEU-2001-0811, August 13, 2001.  
90 Hanna Ojanen, “The EU and Its ‘Northern Dimension: An Actor in Search of a Policy, or a Policy in 
Search of an Actor,” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (September 2000), p. 360. 
91 Non-paper of March 1998, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in H. Ojanen, op. cit., p. 360. 
92 H. Ojanen, op. cit., p. 372. 
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Russia, together with full support for the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership.93 Moreover, the EU provides a market for Russian natural resources, 
plays an indispensable role in Russian trade and FDI account, and gives economic 
and technical assistance to Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union.  
 
2. Institutional Framework in Russian-EU Relations of Interdependence 
 The Russian-EU association was formally established with the signing of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in June 1994. The Agreement came 
into force on December 1
st
, 1997 after long negotiations. In fact, the “ratification of 
the PCA was delayed as a protest against the first war in Chechnya.”94 Since Russian 
intervention in Chechnya raised the human rights concerns within the EU, especially 
those of France, “joint projects with the EU, as set out in the Common Strategy and 
for the most part taken up by the Medium-term document, are suspended, postponed, 
and possibly cancelled.”95 Although the current EU attitude is reluctant to jeopardize 
its relationship with Russia for the Chechen problem, this particular instance 
demonstrated the difference between understandings. The EU views economic and 
political reforms as complementary parts of the Russian transition, whereas Russia 
isolates the economic reforms from the rest. Hence, in order to guarantee democracy 
and respect for human rights in Russia, the EU made the implementation of the PCA 
conditional upon the adherence to common values and principles.96  
 The PCA, as a document designed to set up the legal and institutional basis of 
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the emerging relationship comprises the following topics: improving political 
dialogue, promoting trade, investment, and harmonious economic relations on the 
principles of market economy, strengthening political and economic freedoms, 
supporting Russian democratic reforms, promoting activities of joint interest, 
providing gradual integration between Russia and Europe, and realizing the 
establishment of a free trade zone between the parties.97 These objectives were 
designed to mark the PCA as a reference document for the development of a multi-
dimensional relationship. Despite its ‘idealistic’ rhetoric, the PCA achieved to define 
the relations between Russia and the EU as partnership and equipped this partnership 
with necessary means. 
 The PCA carries out three tasks: 1) setting out the main goals, namely 
economic and political partnership; 2) determining the necessary legal and technical 
reforms for policy convergence; and 3) equipping the relationship with relevant 
institutional instruments.  
 In order to accomplish the above-mentioned tasks, an intensive mechanism of 
consultation and dialogue was the preliminary condition: 
1. Summits98 are held twice a year with participation of the Head of Government of 
the country holding the EU Presidency, President of the EU Commission, and 
President of the Russian Federation.99 The essential function of the Russian-EU 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Affairs, no. 32, (2001), p. 8.  
97   The PCA Full Text, COM (94) 257 final, Article 1, p. 7. 
98   Russian-EU summits were being held even before the  coming into force of the PCA. For instance, 
Yeltsin and President of the European Commission Jacques Santer met on April 19, 1996 (“Yeltsin 
Receives EU Commission President Prior to G-7 Summit,” Moscow ITARTASS, FBIS-SOV-96-078, 
04/19/96), and on March 3, 1997 a delegation of EU leaders arrived at Moscow again to hold  a 
meeting with Yeltsin (“EU Leaders Arrive for 3 March Talks With Yeltsin,” Moscow ITARTASS, 
FBIS-SOV-97-061, 03/03/97). Thus, the PCA regularized the already existing channels of dialogue.   
99   Since December 1997, nine presidential summits convened in various capitals of Europe. The last 
two of them were held in Brussels, on October 3, 2001 and in Moscow, on May 28, 2002. An “urgent 
interaction channel” decided to be set up and monthly ambassadorial-level consultations were started 
as results of the Brussels summit. In the Moscow summit, the EU granted fully fledged market 
economy status to Russia, yet parties could not achieve at a solution on Kaliningrad problem.   
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summits is providing continuity and regularity for bilateral dialogue. Since summits 
are the meetings held at the highest level, parties have a chance to consult on 
common problems and to take coordinative steps towards “increasing convergence of 
positions on  international issues of mutual concern.”100 
2. Cooperation Council meets at ministerial level once a year. “The tasks of the 
Cooperation Council are to monitor the implementation of the PCA, examine any 
major issues arising within its framework, as well as any other bilateral or 
international issues of mutual interest.”101 
3. Cooperation Committee at senior official level holds meetings as often as 
necessary to assist the Council in its tasks and gives appropriate 
recommendations.102 
4. There are also nine sub-committees, dealing with technical issues.  
 
 In addition to these channels of dialogue, there also exist other paths:103 1) a 
Joint Parliamentary Committee, composed of members of the European Parliament 
and the Russian Duma has been established in accordance with the PCA Articles 95-
97; 2) various EU groups in the Troika format (Presidency, CFSP High 
Representative/Council Secretariat, future presidency and commission) meet with 
their Russian counterparts on a regular basis; 3) business-driven forums, advisory 
bodies, and public authorities meet in accordance with the agenda of the formal 
institutions and make joint declarations on specific projects. For instance, industry 
leaders from both sides hold meetings in the EU- Russia Industrialists Round-Table 
                                                          
100   The PCA Full Text, op. cit., Article 6, p. 10. 
101   The EU Official Homepage, “The EU-Russia PCA: Questions and Answers,” 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/pca/q_a.htm 
102   The PCA Full Text, op. cit., Article 92, p. 79. 
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(IRT), which has been founded in 1997 as an advisory body.104 More than 150 
business executives and 30 representatives of public authorities participate to these 
meetings. The roundtable works on energy, transport, and information technology 
(IT) sectors and develops pilot projects for the modernization of the small and 
medium companies (SMEs) in Russia. Another private initiative in Russian-EU 
relations is the European Business Club (EBC), which brings together several 
European companies registered in Moscow since Summer 1995. The EBC currently 
represents and protects the interests of more than 400 companies from the 15 EU 
member countries.105 The Club both serves as a lobbying institution for the rights and 
interests of its members, and constitutes a bridge between the European businessmen 
and Russian regional and governmental officials. One of the recent activities of the 
EBC was the organization of a forum in October 2001, named “Invest in Russia” to 
discuss the investment climate and prospects in Russian economy.106 A similar 
initiative driven by the Russian side is the Institute of Direct Investments (IDI) 
Foundation, which has been established to carry out the Investment Opportunities in 
Russia (IOR) project with the support of the Russian Ministry for Economic 
Development and Trade.107 
 Regularity, amount and essence of these channels apparently carry the 
Russian-EU partnership beyond cooperation. Therefore, from the point of economic 
interdependence, the PCA seems successful as an initiator of institutional channels. 
The PCA, with its efforts to build political cooperation through an institutional 
mechanism and improvement of economic relations, reflects a liberal philosophy. In 
                                                          
104 The European Commission, Enterprise Homepage,  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/business_dialogues/russia/russiaoverv.htm 
105 The EBC Homepage, http://www.ebc.ru 
106 Speech by Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, at the "Invest in Russia 
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Article 6 of the Agreement, this philosophy is expressed:  
The political dialogue shall strengthen the links between Russia and the 
European Union. The economic convergence achieved through this 
Agreement will lead to more intense political relations; shall bring about 
an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual 
concern thus increasing security and stability.108   
 
Nevertheless, for the PCA to go beyond rhetoric and become much more 
applicable, parties continuously try to give substance to their cooperation via 
multiple paths. One of the most significant of these paths and the one, seen as the 
proof of interdependence, is the volume of trade.      
 
3. Trade Relations 
 It rather became a ‘tradition’ to quote the facts about Russian-EU trade in 
order to demonstrate the strong link between the parties. Yet, for an objective 
evaluation one should exhibit both advantages and disadvantages of this association, 
since even disadvantages may give clues about the nature of the Russian-EU 
relationship. The question in mind, for this part, is whether the essence of 
commercial and financial cooperation implies dependence of one party to the other or 
a degree of interdependence, and which one is more profitable for the future of the 
relationship.  
 The facts, mostly listed in economic analyses of Russian-EU relationship, 
begin with a sentence similar to the following one: the EU is “Russia’s most 
important trading partner outside the Commonwealth of Independent States 
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(CIS)”.109 This fact is also supported with the data given by the EU. Accordingly, the 
Union receives nearly 35 % (€ 45 billion) of Russian exports and provides 25 % 
(close to € 20 billion) of its imports.110 On the other hand, “Russia’s share in EU 
external trade in 2000 was 4.4 % of imports and 2.1 % of exports”.111 Russia ranked 
sixth within EU’s trading partners after the United States, Switzerland, Japan, 
Norway and China in the year 2000, and indicated prospects for an higher rank in 
2001. From the ‘trade-to-GDP ratio’ viewpoint, share of exports in Russian GDP was 
27. 4 % and 24.8 % in 1999 and 2000 respectively.112 The ratio of trade to Gross 
Value Added (GVA)113 in the EU was 21 % for the year 2000.114 That is to say, the 
share of EU exports received by Russia (2.1 % of 21 %) in Union’s production is 
much less than that in Russia’s (35 % of 24.8 %).  













Export 16133 19132 25539 21087 14772 19828 115049
Import 21491 23392 27037 23172 25918 45334 59612
Balance -5358 -4260 -1498 -2084 -11145 -25506 -55437
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
*Eurostat data 
                                                          
109   Christopher Bluth. op. cit., p. 27.  
110   The European Union, European Commission, External Relations, EU-Russia Trade, 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/trade.htm 
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Among the EU member states, Germany is the leading trade partner of the 
Russian Federation. “Trade turnover between Russia and Germany grew by about 80 
per cent during the past two years - from 26.5 billion to 47.5 billion marks.”115 In 
2000, Russian exports to Germany rose 50.6 % to $13.4 billion, while imports from 
Germany were up 13% to $6.1 billion. Yet, under Germany’s custom statistics, the 
trade turnover for Russia is on average 50% higher than stated by Russia, since it 
takes into account the imports of Russian natural gas, oil products and non-ferrous 
metals shipped via third countries. Composition of the Russian-German trade is 
precisely a projection of that of the Russian-EU trade. Germany provides 
manufactured goods, cooperation in the fields of high technology, aerospace, 
science-incentive branches, and educational aid in training of Russian managerial 
cadres. 
 Although none of them reaches to the volume of Russian-German trade, some 
of the other EU members play considerably important parts in Russian trade. For 
instance, trade with France in January-September 2001 amounted to $2.7 billion, and 
Russian-British trade volume for the same period was $4.35 billion. Britain is 
responsible for 3.5 percent of the entire Russian trade turnover, whereas Russian 
share in British foreign trade is under 0.5 percent.116 As examples of trade with 
smaller EU members, Russia has trade turnovers with Austria and Finland amounted 
to $3 billion and $5.5 billion respectively in 2001. The structure of Russian exports 
and imports in its trade relations with developed countries is standard: About 70 
                                                          
115 Speech of the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Razov, “Russia-Germany Trade turnover 
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percent of Russian exports are fuel, non-ferrous metals, chemical products, and 
timber. On the other hand, more than 30 percent of Russian imports are composed of 
consumer goods, including cosmetics, perfume, household electronics, medicines, 
clothes, furniture and dishes.117      
EU-Russia trade, 1995-2001 (€ million)  
Year EU Exports ∆ % EU Imports ∆ % Trade balance 
1995 14,382.015   20,149.545   - 5,767.530 
1996 17,110.360 +18.9% 22,133.042 +9.8% - 5,022.682 
1997 23,146.974 +35.3% 25,683.621 +16.0% - 2,536.647 
1998 19,165.825 -17.2% 21,846.875 -14.9% - 2,681.050 
1999 13,373.547 -30.2% 24,735.083 +13.2% - 11,361.535 
2000 19,837 + 48.3% 45,316 + 83.2% - 25,479 
2001* 12,032   24,801     
* Figures for January – June 2001 
(source: Eurostat, Comext) 
 
In sum, Russian-EU trade displays an imbalance. This imbalance is not 
limited with amount, but it also marks the trade composition. In 1999, 60 % of 
Russian exports to the EU comprised raw materials and minerals (mostly natural gas 
and oil), whereas “machinery and transport equipment represent around 40 % (and 
food 15 %)” of Russian imports from the EU.118 General analysis of this unbalanced 
trade relationship brings economists to the conclusion that the Russian-EU trade is 
“eating” Russia’s natural resources, “killing” Russian domestic manufacturers, and it 
“has a negative effect on the future of development of Russia.”119   
                                                          
117 This evaluation is piled from the above-cited Reuters reports. 
118 The European Union, European Commission, External Relations, “Country Strategy Paper 2002-
2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003,” op. cit., p. 4 
119  Igor Leshoukov, Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration, Discussion 
Paper C26, (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 1998), pp. 7-8.  
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MAIN PRODUCTS IN 2001** (Mio euro and %)  
         
EU Imports   Russia share of     EU Exports   Russia share of Balance 
Products Value EU total by products     Products Value EU total by products   
Agricultural products 2,058 2.5    Agricultural products 3,310 5.4 1,252 
Energy 24,363 17.1    Energy 109 0.5 -24,254 
Machinery 338 0.1    Machinery 9,018 3.1 8,680 
Transport. Material 173 0.2    Transport. Material 2,668 1.7 2,495 
Chemical products 2,067 2.7    Chemical products 3,762 2.7 1,694 
Textiles and clothings 280 0.4    Textiles and clothings 1,542 3.7 1,262 
*Eurostat data 
It is true that the character of Russian-EU trade is asymmetric. That is to say, 
Russia is more dependent on the trade turnover with the Union and its members than 
vice versa. As it is explained at the beginning of this chapter, asymmetry is seen as 
an integral part of interdependence, and it gives the EU an influential power on 
Russian Federation. Yet, the EU does not aim to use this power to embarrass and 
make Russia feel side-lined, since it would be more profitable for the Union to use 
this influence for constructive purposes. There are clear-cut signs that the EU 
attaches importance to Russian economic concerns and act accordingly. For example, 
EU’s anti-dumping policy is much criticized. Although “anti-dumping relates only to 
1 percent of Russian exports”, but since “it comprises 10 percent of the manufactured 
goods”, it is far more important than the figures suggest.120 Yet, the EU stresses its 
awareness of Russian  worries and is taking steps for resolution: “In 1998, the EU 
anti-dumping rules were modified to allow the treatment of Russian enterprises as 
operating in a market economy environment on a case-by-case basis.”121 Another 
proof of European sensitivity may be observed on Russian irritation about the 
enlargement process of the EU. After the EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe, 
the Union will begin to absorb nearly 50 % of Russian exports and will cut off 
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Russia’s ties with the region.122 Yet, in order to resolve this forthcoming problem, the 
EU started negotiations with Russia to establish a Common Economic Space (CES), 
precisely a free trade zone, as foreseen in the PCA.123  
 Putting aside the issue of asymmetry, volume of trade between Russia and the 
EU seems significant in terms of its power to stimulate interdependence. As Leif 
Pagrotsky and German Gref, trade ministers of the EU presidency and Russia 
respectively, stated openly; the EU’s share in Russian exports and Russia’s role as 
the main energy supplier to the EU create a “solid basis to start from”.124 This 
declaration makes it evident that parties want to use trade and investment as 
instruments “to develop a  positive interdependence”.125 Their definite aim is 
expressed as follows: 
There are close connections between trade, security, and prosperity. Few 
things are more effective in bringing people together and securing 
stability than economic integration.126  
 
 
4. EU Economic Assistance 
 Another element of the economic relations between Russia and the EU is the 
economic assistance provided by the Union for Russia’s recovery. A long-run 
economic assistance program like the Union’s entails a real commitment to the 
assisted country. Simply, economic assistance is both a sign of vulnerability and an 
instrument of political influence. Since the EU countries are politically and 
economically vulnerable to instability in Russia, they choose to assist to the Russian 
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process of economic recovery and transition to market economy. Yet, this very move 
makes these countries more involved in Russian economy, and hence more 
vulnerable. On the other hand, by providing economic assistance to certain sectors 
such as civil society, the EU tries to influence and control the way Russian reforms 
proceed.   
 The EU assistance to Russia goes well beyond mere economic loans. “The 
EU is the largest provider of economic and technical assistance to Russia,” which 
received € 2.281 billion from the Union between 1991-2000.127 This total assistance 
was largely allocated to sub-institutions such as the TACIS128 program, the European 
Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) in the form of humanitarian and food aid, technical assistance, 




TACIS funds allocations to Russia in million € 
• Russian Federation Action Programmes  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Institutional, legal and administrative reform 16 30 15 28 28 
Private sector support and economic development 29 31 18 14 19 
Alleviation of social consequences of transition 11 3  6 16 
Development of infrastructure networks 24 20 14 0 3 
Environmental protection, natural resources management 5 10 8 4 0 
Rural economic development 13 9 5 0 0 
Policy advice; Small Project Programmes 27 24 20 35 20 
Others 8 13 11 11 10 
Total 133 140 98 98 96 
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• Other Programmes  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Regional programmes 27 27 21 17 23 
Nuclear safety 34 17 12 33 19 
Donor coordination 27 28 28 32 30 
Programme Implementation support 18 16 17 18 18 
Others 6 5 5 2 2 
Total 112 93 83 102 92 
(Source : European Commission) 
 
The TACIS program constitutes the most important part of the economic 
assistance initiative. The program funding is allocated through three cycles.129 First 
and foremost, there are national country programs composed of 3-4 year indicative 
programs and biannual action programs. National country programs determine the 
priorities of a country and then set out the specific projects that will be supported. 
Secondly, there exists a horizontal option, namely regional programs, which work on 
multi-country and cross-border projects to solve environmental problems or promote 
transport networks. Thirdly, in small projects programs, specific tasks such as giving 
advice to governments on particular fields are accomplished.  
 Distribution of the EU funds to these cycles may be exemplified with the 
November 2000 grant, amounted to € 92 million. 38 million euro of this assistance 
package was allocated to the Russian government for topics named in the July 2000 
Action Program, such as legal and administrative reforms to improve public finance, 
banking reforms, and delivery of social and health services. 20 million euro of the 
grant was given to the Small Projects Program for specific tasks (e.g. Managers’ 
Training Program or Investment Support to SMEs). Last portion of the grant, 
amounted to 34 million euro, is allocated to upgrade and strengthen nuclear safety 
designs in Russia.   
 It is obvious that all assistance programs of the EU have an objective to build 
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institutional, legal, and administrative standards, compatible with those in the West. 
Yet, this task of reforming human mentality and code of conduct in Russia brings the 
EU programs face to face with serious problems.  For example, as it is expressed in 
the Tacis Indicative Programme 2000-2003, positive achievements at the pilot 
regions could not be translated into overall success in the reform process. Thus, the 
EU decided to monitor its programmes more strictly to prevent possible misuses of 
funds and to guarantee its increasing - rather risky - involvement to the Russian 
economy. However, such moves of the EU further irritate the Russian government, 
which is sensitive about its authority. On the other hand, the Russian government 
falls short of taking necessary steps towards adaptation due to various reasons. For 
example, in accordance with the TACIS assistance for “Bank Accounting Reform”, 
Russian government should adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
However, that would require to the transparency of bank accounts, and as a result, 
would decrease the capitals of Russian Banks.130 Thus, the Russian government 
chooses to delay the reform plan instead of coping with the costs.  
 Economic assistance is not limited to the EU funds. Member states also make 
individual efforts to provide assistance for Russian transition. For example, the 
British Defense Ministry carries on a Russian Retraining Program since 1995. As a 
part of this program, 9,000 former Russian officers are trained in the fields of 
management, IT, economics and English at one of the eight centers of the project.131 
The EU aid program also provides humanitarian aid to refugees in Chechnya through 
ECHO, in which member states’ agencies take initiative. Danish Refugee Council is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
129 The TACIS Program - Overview, http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm 
130 Dmitry Bulgakov, “European Union Sets $ 3.5 million to Assist Accounting Overhaul”, The Russia 
Journal, issue no. 37 (80), 09/23/2000. 
131 Todd Prince, “From Barracks to Boardrooms,” The Russia Journal, issue no. 40 (83), October 14, 
2000. 
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the largest partner of the ECHO and provides medical supplies and equipment for 
approximately 310,000 refugees in Chechnya and Ingushetia.132 Partner agencies 
such as HELP (Germany), Hilfswerk (Austria), and Action Contre la Fame (France) 
also participate in the food aid project in Russia, which reached to 50 regions since 
1999. 
  Nevertheless, mentality  divergence between Russian and the EU officials 
has a negative effect on these cooperative projects. For instance, the Union has a 
tendency to localize the cooperation by supporting the local initiatives. Yet, for the 
twinning programs, Russia “provides no equivalent to these initiatives in support of 
local projects as advanced by the EU’s Common Strategy.”133 Apparently, the EU 
wants to build a link between unofficial segments of the parties. However, 
“Moscow’s elites are not interested in developing a civil society,” and want projects 
to be controlled by the centers and bureaucracies.134  
 Under the economic assistance topic, the problem is the suffocated position of 
the EU between two forces: urgent necessity for the Russian system to be revised to 
become more operable, and efforts to realize this objective without humiliating 
Russia. On the other hand, Russia experiences complications about its authority, 
coordination of the aid and implementation of joint projects. Despite this tension, the 
EU does not think of giving up the assistance initiative, since this is the only way to 
be a part of the changing atmosphere in Russia. 
 
 
                                                          
132 Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, 
www.eur.ru/eng/newuser/user_eng.php?func=coopspec&id=25 
133   H. Timmermann, op. cit., p. 172 
134   Ibid. 
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5. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 Boosting FDI market is central to Russian economic policy objectives. By 
attracting foreign investors, Russia hopes to solve its hard currency problem, to 
update its capital stock, to get know-how (e.g. for its gas sector), to diversify its 
exports, and hence to become more competitive in the global market. Yet, levels of 
investment in Russia have been disappointing by comparison with other transition 
economies. Between 1994 and 1999, Russia attracted FDI averaging $20 a head, 
whereas Hungary scored ten times this amount in the same period.135  
 One reason for this gap with the other transition economies is the high level 
of uncertainty in Russia. This problem arises from two main sources. First one is the 
vulnerability of the European investors to possible future financial crises in Russia. 
The EU was severely affected in the aftermath of the August 1998 financial crisis 
because of its involvement in the crumbling Russian economy: 
(…) other unanticipated consequence of Russia’s financial collapse in 
summer 1998: Notwithstanding its modest role in international economic 
activity, the disruptive effect on financial markets in Europe and North 
America was immense. (…) Because of the highly leveraged position 
many Western banks and investors had taken in Russian capital markets 
and because of the disproportionate impact of the Russian crisis on 
general investor psychology, Western economies – at least Western 
financial markets – proved far more vulnerable to Russian events than 
anyone had imagined.136 
 
 As a result of the crisis, not only Western investors and banks, but also the bilateral 
trade volume was negatively affected. In 1998, EU exports to Russia fell from € 25.6 
million to € 21.8 million.137 One year before, volume of EU exports increased by 
16.0 %, whereas with the crisis it decreased by 14.9 %. On the other hand, Russian 
                                                          
135 Speech by C. Patten at the “Invest in Russia Cpnference,” op. cit.  
136   R. Legvold, K. Kaiser, A. Arbatov, eds., Russia and the West, (New York: EastWest Institute, 
1999), p. 11.  
137 Eurostat, Comext, The European Union Homepage, European Commission, External Relations, EU-
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exports to EU decreased more sharply: from 35.3 % growth in 1997 to 30.2 % fall in 
1999. Total FDI in Russia had fallen from $11.7 billion to $9.56 billion in 1999.138 
British investment decreased by 50 percent, whereas German share declined to one 
third of its pre-crisis amount.  
 
EU FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT WITH  RUSSIAN FED. (Mio ecu/euro and %) 
         
  1998 1999 2000   1998 1999 2000 
Inflows 34 -6 883 Outflows 435 1,086 1,500 
Share of EU Total (%) 0.0 0.0 0.5 Share of EU Total (%) 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Inward Stocks 2,114 1,730 2,613 Outward Stocks 2,743 3,976 5,476 
Share of EU Total (%) 0.3 0.2 0.3 Share of EU Total (%) 0.3 0.3 0.4 
*Eurostat data 
Among the EU member states, the most vulnerable one was surely Germany. 
“German banks are Russia’s largest lenders, and their credit exposure stands at about 
$33 billion, more than four times the exposure of the U.S. banks.”139 Considering a 
possible spill-over effect of a Russian economic crisis in Eastern Europe, and 
German investments in this region, it is obvious that any situation similar to the one 
in 1998 would cost heavy losses to Germany. Consequently, in such a case, 
Germany’s burden will also be that of the Union, especially after the initiation of 
European Monetary Union.    
Ten Main Foreign Countries-Investors  
to the Russia's Economy in millions of US$ 
COUNTRIES-INVESTORS 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
ALL FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA 2983 6970 12295 11773 9560 
USA 832 1767 2966 2238 2921 
GERMANY 308 332 1647 2848 1695 
CYPRUS 41 825 992 917 923 
GIBRALTAR n/a n/a n/a n/a 780 
GREAT BRITAIN 183 507 2411 1591 734 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Russia Trade, op. cit. 
138   Goskomstat of the Russian Federation, 1999-2000, http://www.gks.ru 




NETHERLANDS 85 981 540 877 541 
SWITZERLAND 436 1348 1756 411 405 
FRANCE 108 43 209 1546 312 
FINLAND n/a n/a n/a n/a 248 
LUXEMBURG n/a n/a n/a n/a 88 
SWEDEN 63 157 72 146 n/a 
AUSTRIA 81 200 378 83 n/a 
JAPAN 75 22 139 60 n/a 
ALL CIS COUNTRIES --- --- 39 9.4 5.6 
Source: Goscomstat of the Russian Federation, 1999, 2000 
 
 
Second reason for the narrow scale in investment market is the uneven 
implementation of the Russian legislation, which limits foreign investment in certain 
fields, such as banking and insurance. In accordance with this problem, the EU 
insists on fundamental reforms on legal, administrative, and technical issues to turn 
Russia into a more transparent state of law, precisely more attractive for international 
investors. However, Russian way to boost FDI is trying to activate western investors 
with directives of the EU. What lies beneath in this simple differentiation between 
the standpoints of Russia and the Union is the different mentalities. In fact, as 
Christopher Patten implied, Russia has a misunderstanding about how the market 
economies function, and has perhaps no idea about how unconventional for the 
investors to hear directives from the EU authorities.140  
 
6. Russian Energy Supply to the EU  
 As it was noted before, Russian Federation, under the pressure of economic 
problems, became a raw-material exporting country.141 Russia is rich in terms of oil 
and gas, that is to say, the energy resources on which industrial countries are heavily 
                                                          
140   C. Patten, op. cit., p. 61 
141   Importance of earnings from the gas and oil trade is exemplified by Brookings Institute economist 
Clifford Gaddy as follows: “Every dollar’s increase in the price of a barrel of petroleum translates into 
roughly $1.5-$2.0 billion of additional yearly export revenues.” cited in Fiona Hill, “Russia: The 21st 
Century’s Energy Superpower?” Brookings Review, Spring 2002, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 28   
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dependent. For instance, “oil and gas alone represented 45 % of Russia’s exports to 
the EU in 1999”.142 The Union, on the other hand, is becoming heavily dependent on 
the imported hydrocarbons. Currently, Russia provides over 15 % of the EU’s needs 
in fuel.143 According to the estimates of the European Commission Green Paper 
issued in November 2000, “by 2020, 67 % of the EU’s demand for gas and 90 % for 
oil will have to be met from external sources”.144 Certainly, this will increase 
Russia’s share, too. This is an open indication of European vulnerability. 
 Nevertheless, EU has some concerns on increasing its vulnerability to 
Russian energy exports. First and foremost, Russia may use energy delivery as a 
diplomatic ‘weapon’. In fact, this possibility seems unlikely, because of two reasons: 
1) there has been a tacit agreement among the European countries, concluded in 
1980s, which limits the Russian energy supply to 30-35 % of each of these countries’ 
markets; 2) Russian share in the energy market is not so vital to the extent that can 
not be easily given up.145  
 Secondly, two great gas companies, namely LUKoil and Gazprom, behave as 
political entities within Russia and play great roles in domestic balance of power 
schemes. For instance, Gazprom’s former president Vyakhirev lobbied for the 
stability in the Balkans in order to sell gas to the regional countries.146 Another 
example is the delay in ratification of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which would 
govern the energy transit flows and set a legal basis for cooperation with the EU, 
                                                          
142   Christopher Patten (Member of the European Commission for External Relations), “The EU and 
Russia,” International Affairs, vol. 47 no. 2, 2001, p. 61.  
143   The European Union Homepage, European Commission, External Relations, EU-Russia Trade, op. 
cit. 
144   European Commission Green Paper issued in November 2000, cited in “Powering up EU-Russia 
Energy Links,” European Voice, 05/17/01, compiled in KnowEurope Database, 
http://www.knoweurope.net (subscription is necessary). 
145  “Kosovo May Trigger Gas War With Europe”, The Russia Journal, issue no. 10 (10), 04/05/1999.  
146 Carol R. Saivetz, “Russian Foreign Policy Free-Lancing: The Cases of LUKoil, Gazprom, and 
Rosvooruzheniye,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1(January-March 2000), pp. 26-33. 
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because of the objections raised by the Gazprom.147 Yet, under the firm leadership of 
Putin and with the backing of the Duma, Russia may minimize the influence of these 
enterprises.  
 Third concern of the EU is the degree of reliability of Russia, in terms of its 
deficiencies in providing the technology and capital to increase production, and the 
legal framework to keep cooperation ongoing.148 For the technology and capital part, 
the EU is ready to boost investments in Russian energy sector. Thus, as soon as 
Russia agrees to draw a legal framework, the ‘strategic energy partnership,’ decided 
in Russian-EU Summit in Paris in October 2000, will be brought into being.  
 
D) CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter handled the economic relations between Russian and the EU by 
founding its arguments on theoretical and historical bases. When components of the 
Russian-EU economic rapprochement are considered, it is found out that these 
components create an interdependent fabric. In the Russian-EU relations of 
interdependence, all criteria (institutional channels, trade volume, vulnerability, and 
overlapping interests) are observed to varying extents. It seems reasonable to argue 
that despite its imbalance, this bilateral relationship is a true case of economic 
interdependence.  
 Through this interdependent relationship, Russia wants to strengthen its 
economic development process, and the EU wants to guarantee a prosperous, 
financially stable Russia. Since Russia is - by size, proximity, and potential - very 
influential on the continental economic system, which will mean the EU economic 
system after the completion of enlargement; recovery of Russia will be decisive.  
                                                          
147   “Powering up EU-Russia Energy Links,” European Voice, op. cit. 
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 Furthermore, the EU wants to get rid of its security concerns about Russia. 
For this end, the Union uses the benefits of economic interdependence as a carrot for 
the continuation of Russian political reforms. Apparently, economic interdependence 
is not an end in itself, but rather a ‘political’ choice of the parties to overcome the 

























 Security factor basically refers to the political and military side of the 
Russian-EU relationship. In the previous chapter, relying on the exploration on 
degree and substance of economic interdependence, it is concluded that there is an 
obvious increase in economic ties and this betterment serves a political end. That is 
to say, parties do not limit themselves to economic partnership and take steps for 
going beyond. Yet, it is always difficult to make a connection between two different 
fields: economy and politics. One may easily claim that for economic cooperation, 
there should already exist political will. Yet, it is both possible to put politics in front 
of economy, and vice versa, in hierarchy of fields of rapprochement. In this chapter, 
concept of security and factors affecting security concerns will be investigated 
initially. Then, the chapter will proceed to the examination of  perceptions and 
capabilities of the each party. This part of the paper will be concluded with a 
discussion on the possibility of a Russian-EU security cooperation. Throughout the 
chapter, the central question in mind will be that of correlation between economic 
and political rapprochement. Which one comes first, economic interdependence or 
security factor? How do they affect each other? Is it possible for one of them exist 
without the other? Answers to these questions will enable the researcher to see 
whether economic interdependence is indispensable for building a deeper affiliation 
in the fields of politics and security.  
 
A) THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY 
 Concept of security is another complex subject matter for the social sciences 
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reader, but in a way different from the notion of interdependence. In fact, the word 
itself has a vague meaning in every mind. This meaning is usually an “open” one 
that is “in between the narrow (always state, only military) and the wide (everything 
people worry about)” variations.148   This reflection of the concept can best be 
described with what it is associated with. First and foremost, labelling something as 
a security issue implies a state of emergency and absolute priority.149 Hence, a 
security issue gives actors the right to break the rules and use extraordinary 
means.150 This effect of security as a simple word is related to its equivalents: quest 
for “safety or freedom from dangers”151; non-war, survival, stability, and power. 
However, these notions are not sufficient to define security within the domain of 
international politics. In the terminology of social sciences, definition of the concept 
may vary according to the level of analysis and the particular historical period that is 
in question. That is to say, the notion should be evaluated according to whether it is 
handled at national, international or global level, and whether it is related to the 
Cold War or post-Cold War  period.  
 Since exploring the whole literature on security is beyond limits of this 
thesis, it is relevant to determine the conceptual framework that will be used in this 
chapter. This framework is drawn in accordance with the character of the main 
actors in this research. First and foremost, neither the national nor global security 
perspectives are applicable to the Russian-EU case, since it involves a relationship 
between independent governmental actors. This particular relationship implies a 
                                                          
148 Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community,” 
edited in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett Security Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 79. 
149  Ibid., p. 80 
150  Ibid. 
151  Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “Future Use of Military Power” edited in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy 
Godson, George H. Quester, ed., Security Studies for the 21st Century, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 
1997), p. 172 
 57 
degree of cooperation, but with an emphasis on classical national152 interests. Thus, 
this chapter will adopt a standpoint similar to that of advocates of international 
security. International security perspective broadens the framework by drawing 
attention onto the links between states. Accordingly, a nation-state cannot shape its 
security policy in isolation, and either decreases or increases security of the other 
states as a result. This relational stance refers to the security dilemma, which breaks 
the isolation of the nation-state and forces it to consider other states’ capabilities and 
intentions. That is to say, in order to watch out for possible threats and responses to 
them, nation-states should be active in the system both for competition and 
cooperation. Bearing in mind its state-centric tone viewing limited cooperation 
possible in international system, international security standpoint seems to be in 
between realism and liberalism.153 
 From the historical perspective, it is easier to make a distinction. During the 
Cold War, security had been a less complicated notion with definite boundaries. 
Very briefly, the concept comprised topics such as the causes of instability, conflict, 
and war; the threat, use and management of military force; balance between the 
efforts to reduce threats and to maintain capabilities154; coordination between 
political, economic, and military interests in pursuit of foreign and domestic 
interests155. Main reason for such a limited framework was the division of the world 
into two confrontational ideological and military camps, and the immediate threat of 
                                                          
152  The term ‘national’ may seem odd when it is used for the EU. Yet, as it is explained in Chapter I, 
members of the EU has common national interests when Russia is in question. Moreover, similar to 
nation-states, the Union has an aim of protecting its economic and territorial integrity. This is why the 
EU adopts a security and defense policy. As Ole Waever expressed, “classical political security 
concerns appear but are mostly conceived for “Europe” not individual states.” (O. Waever, op. cit., p. 
69) 
153  Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” edited in Robert Art and Kenneth 
Waltz, The Use of Force, (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 35-65 cited in R. H. 
Shultz, Jr., op. cit., p. 46 
154  Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., op. cit., p. 173 
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a major nuclear war. Thus, the natural consequence of this urgent danger was 
referring security as the survival of the nation-state intact with its territorial and 
economic integrity.   
 This limited perspective on security has been criticized during and after the 
Cold War as being one-dimensional and short-sighted.156 In the post-1989 era, 
criticism of the traditional security standpoint increased because of two 
developments: Firstly, “relief from the hitherto dominant source of insecurity, 
namely, superpower nuclear conflict,”157 and secondly, globalization158. In this new 
conjuncture, many notions and organizations either lost their raison d’étre or got 
adapted to the new conditions. Likewise, traditional domain of security, that seemed 
extremely restricted for a world facing with threats other than major nuclear war, 
needed revision. Non-traditional security paradigm has to respond to multi-
dimensional and multi-faceted threats, such as international terrorism, illegal 
immigration, money-laundering, drug-trafficking, environmental problems, and 
nuclear safety issues. In the non-traditional sense of security, military dimension 
does not prevail anymore. There are threats as serious as the threat of use of force, 
for instance, technological backwardness, economic decline, environmental 
degradation.   
 These two variations of security -traditional and non-traditional- are named 
as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security. Obviously, ‘soft’ security issues are overlooked and 
described as such in order to imply the inability of the environmental or economic 
threats to pave the way for immediate collapse of states. Yet, the gradually 
                                                                                                                                                                      
155  Garry L. Guertner, in the Discussion section of Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., op. cit., p. 201 
156  Ibid. 
157  Ibid., p. 16. 
158  The term globalization here refers to advances in communication and transportation technologies 
and lowering trade barriers, which bring about increase in social and economic threats such as drug-
trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering, organized crime and international terrorism. 
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destructing nature of these threats should not undermine their significance, 
especially with regard to the impossibility of incarcerating them within nation-state 
boundaries. 
 With regard to the historical categorization of the concept, although wider 
area of post-Cold War security seems interesting and equally challenging, for the 
purposes of this study, this research will concentrate on the traditional understanding 
of security. Reasons for choosing this kind of limited conceptualization are: Firstly, 
narrowing down the framework of the research, secondly continuing dominance of 
traditional security paradigm159, and thirdly making the contrast between economic 
interdependence and security factor sharper. That is to say, some issues fall on grey 
areas when the broader definition of security is chosen, and these issues may scrape 
the challenging side of this study: trying to set a linkage between two distinct 
spheres, economics and politics.     
 
B) HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN THREAT 
PERCEPTIONS 
  Russia and western Europe had followed different historical paths as 
mentioned beforehand. Their respective experiences brought into two divergent 
traditions. On the one hand stands the western European politico-economic tradition 
based on private property, individualism, scientific enlightenment, and political 
participation of different social strata to governance. On the other, there exists 
Russian political culture, founded upon communalism, mysticism, authoritarianism, 
                                                          
159  The most prominent example of this dominance is the response given to the September 11 attacks 
on the United States. Although actors in international politics diversified rapidly in the aftermath of the 
Cold War (e.g. terrorist groups), realist methods for providing security (e.g. military action, coalitions 
and alliances) remained as efficient instruments. This example indicates that there is no clear dividing 
line between the two security definitions, and reality consists of both. 
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and high self-esteem. Natural outcome of this dichotomy has been the presence of 
two distinct entities on the same continent, mostly referring to each other as the rival 
party, and in times of serious trouble as an ally. It is claimed that except for brief 
episodes against a mutual enemy, such as Sweden in 1700s, Napoleon at the turn of 
the 19th century, Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany in WWs, a perpetual ‘cold war’ 
existed between Russia and western Europe.160  
 
1. Factors Shaping Russian Security Thinking  
 Fear of an external threat dominated the Russian security perceptions and 
remained as an endemic part of the Russian psyche, despite the fact that invaders of 
the Russian lands have been eventually overcome.161 Russian security concerns had 
partly stemmed from the geographical conditions, namely non-existence of natural 
boundaries, and partly from the collective memory of wars fought with the powers 
of the East and West.162 Outcome of this suspicion constituted the most prevalent 
characteristic of the Russian mindset on security, namely defending the borders 
through an imperial policy of expansionism. In accordance with this reasoning, 
Russia remained as a dominant imperial power of the world until 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution. Yet, imperial experience left a footprint on Russian self-image in the 
way that Russians equated the phenomenon of ‘Russia’ with greatness and 
uniqueness.163  
                                                          
160 Georgi M. Derlugian, “What Happens When Russia is the West’s Ally? Some Historical 
Geopolitical Regularities,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 225, Washington DC, January 25, 2002.  
161  Robert D. Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite, Akihiko Tanaka, Engaging Russia, (New York: The 
Trilateral Commission, 1995), pp. 3-4.  
162  For instance, the Mongol domination, lasted for more than two centuries, Napoleon’s invasion of 
imperial Russia in 1812 or German occupation of the USSR, which began in June 1941, and had even 
held Leningrad under siege. 
163  Value of territory and greatness in the geographical sense has lost its influence beginning from 
1945, since nuclear arms entered into the defense options and efficacy of “numerically superior 
forces and a large industrial war potential” became discussable. Lothar Ruhl, “The Historical 
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   Russia responded to the threats coming from its borders by expanding and 
putting buffer zones in between its territory and the possible rival country. A clear 
example of this Russian attitude is the Soviet expansion westwards after the WWII 
to protect itself from a future revival of the traditional German threat.  
 This inward-looking but expansionist attitude in Russian history, which  
pulled Russia into reclusion, affected the European perceptions. For western 
Europeans, Russia was both a center of gravity with its cultural achievement, and a 
peripheral threat to Europe.  
 
2. Factors Shaping European Security Thinking  
 European countries tried to solve their security problem either by 
establishing a balance of power  mechanism (e.g. the European Concert of the 19th 
Century) or creating a security community164. In the aftermath of the WWII, they 
embraced the goal of building a security community through a less ambitious path, 
namely economic integration, with the hope of its spilling over to cooperation in 
other fields. Hence, the European fear of being thrown into the historical rivalries 
has been overcome by pursuing a policy of “desecuritization.”165 Through 
desecuritization, , in which concentration of the parties are drawn from security to 
issues of asecurity, in European case, to economic cooperation, Germany was firmly 
incorporated into the European Community.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Background of Russian Security Concepts and Requirements” edited in Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia 
and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 29  
164  Security community is a concept first raised by Karl Deutsch in Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). It is defined as a community in 
which “states become integrated to the point that they will settle their differences short of war.” That 
is to say, use of force turns into an obsolete means of conduct. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “ 
Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective” edited in E. Adler and M. Barnett, ed., Security 
Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3 
165  The term “desecuritization” refers to a process through which a political entity gets totally free 
from security concerns or exits from the sphere of security. O. Waever, op. cit., p. 91. 
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 On the other hand, Russia’s image as the primary threat to Europe had grown 
under the Soviet rule. With the reactivation of the ‘internationalist’ foreign policy, 
whose main task was projection of the communist ideology to other states, and 
Soviet occupation in eastern Europe, historical fears about Russia were multiplied in 
western Europe. Yet, in the aftermath of the WWII, western European countries had 
to find another way to contain Germany and Soviet Russia, since their economic 
cooperation and war-torn military capabilities were far from deterring these two 
countries.  
 In order to cope with the threat posed by the USSR, only rational solution 
seemed as providing permanent U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe. Thus, 
Europe was spared from the issues of security and defense by transferring the bulk 
of responsibility to the U.S. and the Atlantic Alliance founded with the signing of 
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.166 Consequently, The Soviet Union perceived NATO 
and the US, due to its security umbrella over Europe, as the real threats and enemies 
during the Cold War. That is why even after the demise of the Cold War, the EU has 
not been viewed seriously as a  significant security actor of global politics.  
 Although the EC made several attempts to establish an all-European security 
structure (e.g. Western European Union, European Defence Community, European 
Political Cooperation), history of security initiatives apart from NATO ended up 
with failure because of the presence of different perspectives interpreting the goals 
of integration in totally different ways. These failed attempts marked the creation of 
European security cooperation, simply by deepening the gap between economic and 
political spheres of integration. As a result of this break-up, European security has 
been regarded purely as United States’ responsibility, hence the Europeans were 
                                                          
166  Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, European Military Revolution, (London: 
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alienated from the sphere of security. Therefore, issues of security and defense have 
mostly been considered as fields constituting “an anomaly, a missing element in the 
construction of Europe.”167  
 
3) Implications of the Demise of the Cold War and Reunification of Germany   
 Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the demise of the communist rule in 
eastern European countries paved the way for a turning point in Russian-European 
security relationship.  From the Russian side, the breakdown of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, accompanied with economic collapse and shrinking of borders, added 
a sense of humiliation and loss to the Russian psyche.168 Russia had lost its Great 
Power status, its buffer zone in eastern Europe against western Europe and 
especially Germany, and faced with the danger of being isolated from the European 
order, either as a rival or an ally.  
 Historically, Germany was a critical country not only for the Soviet Union, 
but also for France and Britain who therefore were hesitant about giving their consent 
to the German reunification. Collective historical memory warned that a reunified 
Germany could be a jeopardy for European security. Reunification became possible 
on the understanding that Germany would remain embedded in the security umbrella 
of NATO and in a unified Europe. German Chancellor Kohl accepted both NATO 
and the supranational authority of the EU as a way to prevent renationalization of 
German security.169  
 Mutual concerns of European countries and especially Russia about German 
reunification have been mitigated by the firm incorporation of Germany into the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Centre for European Reform, March 2001), pp. 17-18. 
167  Ibid., p. 19 
168   R. Blackwill, R. Braithwaite, A. Tanaka, op. cit., p. 5 
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and NATO. However, western European countries were face to face with several 
other security challenges: danger of losing the US commitment, possibility of 
German domination within European institutions, regional conflicts that would 
arouse in the south and east of Europe as a result of the Soviet power vacuum, and 
Russia, neither an empire nor a nation-state, but still a country holding a powerful 
nuclear arsenal. In order to solve these problems, the EU took important steps, one 
of which was the decision of enlargement. Political reasoning behind this decision 
was “anchoring Germany more solidly in [Europe’s] middle rather than making it a 
‘border state’”.170 Moreover, enlargement enabled the Union to “extend the zone of 
peace, stability, and prosperity” to potential areas of local conflict.171 That is to say, 
only way to protect Eastern Europe from fragmentation and the European integration 
from effects of this turmoil seemed as expanding the boundaries of the security 
community. Therefore, European enlargement is a political decision to build stability 
in the continent.  
 With regard to their respective threat assessments, history plays an important 
role for Russian-EU relations. Especially from the security angle, parties still see 
each other as the main determinants in their individual schemes. Yet, for Russia, the 
EU is a totally new representative of western European security structure. Since it is 
also an emerging political actor, new even to its own members in the political sense, 
Russia does not know how to deal with the Common European Security and Defence 
Policy (CESDP) and its capabilities. On the other hand, the EU hesitates about 
bypassing NATO by establishing an association with Russia with special emphasis 
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on security. Furthermore, the EU is suspicious about the Russian intentions due to its 
authoritative governmental build-up, restrictive measures on democratic aspects of 
the political life, and obviously the historical experience, which presents no past 
experience of security cooperation with Russia except in times of crisis.  
 
C) RESPECTIVE SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA 
AND THE EU 
 In the post-Cold War environment, both Russia and the west European 
countries had passed through processes of radical change. In this transitional period, 
parties tried to understand what kind of threats they were faced with and ways to 
cope with them. This process had been particularly important for Russia, since its 
national security identity, foreign policy tradition and institutions were radically 
changed from the Soviet rule.172 On the European side, a need for resecuritization173 
emerged in the years following the breakdown of the communist regimes. For 
various reasons that will be listed later on, the EU decided to have a security pillar 
and implemented this decision by planning the activation of a Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF) in 2003.  
 
1. Russian Perceptions 
 Determination of the Russian security interests is accomplished through a 
debate on what Russia is and where it belongs. This debate, rooted back in the 19th 
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century174, took place between the ‘Atlanticists,’ who “hold that Russia needs to 
become a part of the Atlantic club, by a combination of integration with Western 
institutions and adaptation to Western ways,” and the ‘Eurasianists,’ who view 
Russia as a “unique civilization, a synthesis of European and Asian 
elements.”175According to the reasoning of the Atlanticists, recovery of the Russian 
economy and revival of Russia as a great power were possible only through gaining 
the West’s support for “success of Russia’s economic reforms, promotion of 
democracy, and integration into Western civilisation and international 
institutions.”176 Hence, Atlanticists sought to join in important economic and 
political bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and even NATO177.  On the other hand, the 
Eurasionists found this allegiance overly romantic and “stressed the great power 
interests, Pan-Slavism and the maintenance of the Russian military potential.”178 
Accordingly, Russia would be a ‘balance holder’ between Europe and Asia with its 
distinct civilisation and geopolitical status. That is to say, Russia should “initiate and 
maintain a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilisations, and states” instead of 
associating itself only with Western Europe.179 Therefore, Russia should establish its 
distinctive role firmly by re-building ties with its South, especially with the Muslim 
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world and ex-Soviet states.180  
 As a result of this debate, Russia adopted “a synthesis that still emphasized 
cooperation and integration with the West, but also incorporated a strong measure of 
Russian Eurasianism and great power thinking, rooting the policy in a more 
traditional cast.”181 Yet, for depicting the vital security interests of a country, 
theories and assumptions are not sufficient. For security policy to be realistic, a 
compromise should be achieved between the aspirations and capabilities.  
 Russia is no longer a superpower, yet its claim to being a great power 
continues relying on two bases: 1) vast nuclear arsenal, inherited from the Soviet 
Union, and 2) its seat in the UN Security Council as a permanent member.182 
Nevertheless, to keep this claimed international status, Russia would either enhance 
its capabilities to the extent of a great power or determine a more viable destination 
for its foreign policy. Due to Russia’s aspirations to be a Great Power, Russian 
interests area of operation can not be as narrow as those of an average  nation-state; 
nor can they be one-dimensional or isolated. However, Russian interests are limited 
with shortcomings, such as economic deterioration impeding the modernization 
efforts for weary infrastructure, human capital problem due to diseases, high 
mortality and low fertility rates, and atrophied military power.183   
 In accordance with the need to depict a realistic scheme of Russian national 
interests, it is compulsory to look at both the official documents and historically 
based threat perceptions. The Foreign Policy Concepts (1993, 1997, 2000) and 
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Military Doctrines (1993 and 2000) of the Russian Federation contain minor 
changes in tone and content, avoid naming any country or bloc as an enemy and 
state that the most crucial threats to Russian security lay in the internal conditions of 
Russia rather than the international system.184 Latest of these documents, the Foreign 
Policy Concept of the year 2000, indicates that Russian concerns about territorial 
integrity and aspirations for being a great power capable of influencing the world 
politics continue.185 Nevertheless, new issues came along such as growing reaction 
against a U.S.-led unipolar world order, dependence of Russian economic system 
and information environment on external influences, and increasing negative views 
on NATO operations outside the Washington Treaty without UN Security Council 
authorization.186 Apparently, these pessimistic changes are closely related with the 
August 1998 financial crisis and NATO intervention in Kosovo. Especially, the 
economic decline affected Russian security perceptions so deeply that the primary 
threat to Russia’s national interests is declared as its internal economic situation.187 
In fact, this is an example of how internal conditions of Russia reshapes its interests 
and perceptions. A comprehensive list of these security priorities is as follows: 
1. As the basis of national security, threats of the utmost importance are those 
posed upon territorial integrity and sovereignty. From this perspective, Russia 
sees “local wars, discrimination against Russian citizens living abroad and 
expansion of military alliances to the detriment of Russia’s security” as the most 
prominent jeopardies.188 These new threats necessitate relevant security build-up 
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for internal conflicts, extension of the Russian sphere of influence beyond its 
borders, avoidance of external intervention to CIS countries in case of local 
disputes. 
2. Russian foreign policy elites and statesmen view the economic problems as the 
main obstacle in front of Russian objectives of growth and revival. Thus, 
economic development is seen as the only way of strengthening the military might 
and restoring the ‘Great Power’ role of Russia in the international arena. That is 
why economic issues became an integral part of Russian security perceptions. For 
instance, since defense industry is one of the pillars of Russian economy, 
American reaction against Russian arms sales to Iran is not merely perceived as an 
issue about trade , but rather “about undermining Russia’s defense industries, 
military reform, and modernization.”189    
3. Russian aspiration to be a ‘Great Power’ is closely related with the humiliation it 
experienced in the aftermath of the Cold War, fear of being isolated from the 
international society, and fear of losing its identity and role, which make Russia 
unique. Threats to this national goal are: a uni-polar world order, in which 
Russia will not have a say; a one-dimensional Russian foreign policy; and 
formation or expansion of organizations, capable of making military 
interventions in the Russian Near Abroad.  
 
 Evaluating these officially established security interests from the lens of 
Russian history, it seems apparent that basic Russian concerns are standing still. Yet, 
instruments to overcome these concerns changed. Being a multi-ethnic federation and 
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a former empire, Russia is afraid of further disintegration. Russia is also highly 
vulnerable to its neighbors, especially to those carrying a conflict potential. The most 
pertinent examples of this Russian concern are the war in Chechnya, supported by the 
Muslims in southern neighbors of Russia, and the was in Afghanistan with its danger 
of spreading in Central Asia. Another Russian concern is being encircled and isolated 
from the international arena. Especially with the Afghan campaign of the US, 
Russians began to feel “encircled by a dense ring of military and intelligence 
gathering installations belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance.”190 Likewise, the EU 
and NATO expansions, which will more or less draw new dividing lines in Europe, 
are seen as threats. According to the Russian perceptions, the EU memberships of 
Finland and Austria, two neutral states of the Cold War era, represent an example of 
central and east European countries acquiring Western security guarantees. Russia 
believes that the EU membership of these countries has brought indirect NATO 
commitment to the Russian border, and integrated framework of economy and 
security will exclude Russia.191 Yet, both the EU and NATO try to curb the Russian 
worries by increasing Russian participation in the exclusionary bodies.  For this end, 
the EU consults with Russia on the questions of enlargement (e.g. the Kaliningrad 
Question) and promises for a common free trade area. On the other hand, NATO 
agreed to establish a joint council with Russia, in which Russia will have a voice in 
discussion sessions, but no right to veto the NATO decisions. 
 As the threats perceived by Russia have changed, so have the means to deal 
with these threats. Considering the war in Chechnya, it is apparent that Russia can not 
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solve its security problems by resorting to military means, simply because its military 
capabilities are obsolete and irrelevant for the post-Cold war tasks. In order to 
respond internal threats, Russia needs to cut the number of its forces and restructure 
its army. Nevertheless, Russia will keep its nuclear arsenal despite its irrelevancy for 
local conflicts to maintain its claim to be a Great Power.192 
  Inadequacy of traditional means, namely military capability, to satisfy the 
security interests causes the search for other possible means such as diplomacy 
through consultation, international organizations, and economic cooperation. That is 
why Russia puts extra emphasis on multilateralism, international regimes like UN or 
OSCE, economic stability, increase in FDI and trade volume, and integration with the 
global economy. Being devoid of sufficient mechanisms of a Great Power, Russia 
adopts a foreign policy advocating for a multilateral international order, in which U.S. 
does not impose its own aspirations on other states, and multi-dimensional external 
relations with Western Europe, U.S., China, Japan, Iran, India, S. Korea, and its Near 
Abroad to legitimize its status as a ‘balance holder.’ 
 
2. EU Perceptions and Policies 
 At this point, Russian and European positions converge. Being distant from 
the security matters for so long due to the presence of NATO, European capacity to 
cope with its security interests is very weak.  
 First of all, what are European security interests? Since CFSP is an 
intergovernmental body, it is difficult to mention a single unified list of European 
security interests. Each member of the EU has its own security perceptions, as it was 
exemplified in the case of the ND. Since Russia poses multiple -soft and hard- 
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security threats to Nordic countries that are incapable of dealing with them on their 
own, Finland, as one of these countries, chose to assign this task to the EU. 
Likewise, Germany realizes its own aspirations on eastern Europe and goal to lead 
the EU through the enlargement process of the Union. From the French viewpoint, 
the EU is a foreign policy instrument again to have a leading role in Europe and to 
construct a multilateral world order, in which only a unified Europe can be a match 
of the US. The CFSP, itself, is revived in the 1998 St. Malo Declaration partially as 
a result of a change in British standpoint:1) Tony Blair has wanted Britain to play a 
key role in European integration or even lead a part of it. Or from another point of 
view, Blair chose to control the integration process by involving in it instead of 
remaining at the sideline; 2) it seems easier to keep the U.S. security commitment in 
Europe via enhancing the European military capabilities and silencing the advocates 
of ‘burden-sharing.’193  
 The factors behind the EU decision to adopt a security dimension gather 
together different individual perspectives of the members, and pave the way for 
convergence between Russian and European interests.  
 After the humiliations experienced in the Bosnian Wars and Kosovo, a broad 
consensus was created on the necessity to play an autonomous role in international 
security agenda.194 The EU weight in global economic structure should be counter-
balanced with weight in international affairs. Yet, there is a huge gap between the 
EU and the US  in terms of military capability. Similar to Russia, the EU is lacking 
the features necessary to deal with contemporary threats.   
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 Although both Russia and the EU are devoid of relevant means, they both 
want to have influential roles in global politics. The EU needs to avoid local 
conflicts in its near abroad in order to secure its economic position. Likewise, 
Russia made the connection between economic development and security by 
defining them as intertwined parts of its national vital interests. 
 Divergence between the European and American interests on security issues 
is another important reason for change in perceptions. That is to say, since the 
common enemy and its threat of use of nuclear weapons faded away, the EU began 
to find opportunity to express its own viewpoint. Apparently, the EU differentiates 
from the American attitude by being less concerned with ‘rogue’ states, giving 
priority in security spending to cultural and diplomatic means rather than soldiers 
and weapons, and adopting a multilateral approach towards international politics.195 
Russia favors  this divergence, yet faces with a dilemma on whether it is better to 
have NATO or to leave the EU alone on the continent with a potential “German 
problem.”    
  
D) MUTUAL SECURITY CONCERNS OF RUSSIA AND THE EU  
1. Shared Goals  
 Although it is an unlikely possibility in the medium term, common goal of 
Russia and the EU is an historically rooted one, namely to prevent the emergence of 
a dominant continental force. In such a case, not only Russia and the EU, but also 
the US will agree to establish an alliance. A non-traditional example of a threat to 
European stability is now Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist attacks of the 
fundamentalist organizations. Russia and the EU reached an accord on cooperation 
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against terrorism in the October 2001 Brussels summit.   
 Since accession of Finland in 1995, the EU and Russia share a 700 mile long 
border, which will lengthen after the completion of the enlargement process. Hence, 
much of the so-called adjacent regions will coincide with Russia’s Near Abroad196. 
That is to say, Russia will lack a buffer zone with western Europe except Ukraine. 
This may cause problems in case of a local conflict like the one in the former 
Yugoslavia. Under such conditions, Russia may try to avoid NATO intervention, yet 
being devoid of economic and military capacity to be influential, may compromise 
and act in accordance with the EU policies. For example, the EU expects Russian 
participation to the settlement of crises in Moldova and the North Caucasus.197 Yet, 
because of the non-existence of the EU military assets and the consultative attitude 
of the EU towards Russia, the EU security initiative seems unchallenging for Russia. 
 Both the EU and Russia have reservations on the unilateralist attitude of the 
Bush administration. Precisely, for the EU to obtain a weight in international politics, 
the world order should be a multilateral one.198 Bearing in mind its opposition to 
rhetoric of anti-Americanism, the EU is in favor of a multilateral world order, in 
which major decisions about macro-politics are taken collectively via consultation.199 
For being a seriously-taken counterpart of the U.S., the EU advocates for 
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multilateralism. This same objective is also in the Russian foreign policy agenda. 
Thus, at this point, Russia and the EU are seen as natural partners. The tricky point is 
that with a hesitant attitude inherited from the Cold war years, the EU both desires to 
be a world power and refrains from decoupling from the Transatlantic relations. 
Another concern of the Europeans is the danger of being played off against the U.S. 
by Russia.200 Ironically, this fear itself resulted in insistence of the EU officials on 
presenting the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) as a 
mechanism enhancing, not undermining NATO.201 However, this false reaction 
creates a situation, in which Russia automatically feels more isolated and 
marginalized. Therefore, only way to form a multilateral environment by avoiding 
both being used as a wedge to divide Europe and the USA, and giving Russia the 
impression of being sidelined is pursuing a policy of integrationism for Russia. 
  With regard to NATO, the main security entity of the continent, it is a fact 
that Russia still perceives the presence and expansion of the Alliance towards its 
Eastern frontier as a threat.  Besides, Russians tend to make a distinction between 
“the good West of Europe/EU” and the “bad West of America/NATO.”202 Even the 
recently launched goal of creating credible military forces for the EU could not 
change this attitude deeply rooted in the Russian public opinion.203 Apparently, 
Russia makes this distinction with the hope to diminish American influence and 
commitment on Europe. Yet, President Putin, different from his predecessor, does 
not exaggerate this wishful thinking and pursues a policy of ‘recoupling’ Russia with 
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Europe instead of ‘decoupling’ Europe from the transatlantic relationship.204 For this 
purpose, Russia embraces the role of operational means supplier and proposes “a 
non-strategic system of missile defense based mainly on Russian territory near the 
borders of countries that could potentially launch a missile attack.”205 Moreover, 
Russia is capable of supplying complementary operational assets to the EU, such as 
cooperation on Russian-European satellite navigation systems project 
(GLONASS/GALILEO).206 Needless to say, Russian and European military systems 
are operationally incompatible to a great extent, and the EU would not take initiative 
in projects undermining the U.S. commitment. Nevertheless, cooperative efforts of 
the parties are beneficial for both: through security cooperation, Russia tries to 
maintain its nuclear arsenal and technological assets to be a valuable world power, 
an indispensable actor of the international system. On the other hand, the EU gets rid 
of its military deficiencies by incorporating Russia into the European security 
arrangements. 
As they were mentioned above, Russia and the EU aim to preserve the 
continental peace and construct a multilateral world order. With regard to local 
conflicts in Europe, there are prospects for military cooperation, through which 
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parties can both avoid the US intervention and develop their own military 
capacities.207  
 A more blurred mutual interest behind Russian-EU rapprochement is their 
use of each other as means of legitimation. More precisely, as the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty equipped the EU with a new policy means, namely CFSP, which needs to be 
experimented. This experiment should be conducted on a rather easy case, on which 
foreign policy interests of 15 members of the EU may converge. That is why, the 
first ‘common strategy’ document of the EU is prepared for relations with Russia. 
According to the EU perspective, foreign policy experience with Russia will 
contribute to the Union’s legitimacy as an international actor.208 On the other hand, 
Russia enjoys a new status within multi-directional partnership. The Russian-EU 
partnership, itself, with its institutions and consultative mechanisms on global 
affairs, legitimizes parties’ claims to be equal major powers in macro-politics. 
 To sum up, the EU does not pose any serious threats to Russia, and even does 
keep some of Russia’s fears under control (e.g. Germany). Yet, the EU should 
evaluate the significance of economic development for Russia, and how Russia tends 
to link its economic interests with its security needs. On the other hand, an 
economically developing Russia is not enough to overcome European concerns about 
Russia. An economically strong Russia under an authoritarian rule, not sufficiently 
being controlled by democratic means, is a greater security problem for Europe, 
especially when its continuing nuclear might is considered. Thus, the EU wants to be 
assured about the stability of the democratic regime in Russia even more than 
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accomplishment of its economic transition. Since Russia puts its economic interests 
under the title of security and the EU has an economic orientation first and foremost, 
economy seems as if the stage where mutual security concerns will be consulted and 
solved. Yet, there will always be a third party, namely NATO, when European 
security is discussed. Consequently, the Russian-EU security cooperation can go as 
far as it is accompanied by the NATO consent. 
  
2. Areas of Tension 
 Shared goals of Russia and the EU, and the institutional mechanism 
established by the parties increase the prospects for change in continental history. 
However, for this interdependent association to become a model for other historically 
conflict-oriented relationships, it should be tested. By focusing on the areas of 
tension, it is possible to measure the capacity of the Russian-EU mechanism to 
resolve common problems. 
  Russian intervention in Chechnya raised the human rights concerns within 
the EU, especially those of France. Russia referred to the subject matter as an 
exclusively internal part of Russian politics, whereas the EU evaluated the war as a 
setback in the democratic values. Consequently, “joint projects with the EU, as set 
out in the Common Strategy and for the most part taken up by the Medium-term 
document, are suspended, postponed, and possibly cancelled.”209 For instance, 
“ratification of the PCA was delayed as a protest against the first war in 
Chechnya.”210 Yet, despite the threats to implement economic sanctions against 
Russia unless certain steps including a cease-fire are taken, the EU is reluctant to 
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jeopardize its relations with Russia.211 President Putin’s handling of the Chechen 
problem in the international arena has also been effective on the European hesitation 
to take action against Russia. Putin’s argument has been that “Chechnya was the 
frontline of an attack by political Islam on Russia and Europe as a whole, that by its 
military action Russia was in fact fighting for Europe’s security as much as its 
own.”212 Especially, after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon, Russian efforts to demonstrate Chechen case as another 
terrorist action became more apparent during the October 2001 Russian-EU 
summit.213 Current situation is a stalemate between Russia and the EU, in which 
Russia insistently objects to any joint humanitarian action of the EU in the region 
and the EU continues to stress the importance of the issue in every speech or 
document about Russia. 
 The Kaliningrad Question is named as the most important issue of the 
bilateral relations in the Russian-EU summit in Moscow on May 29, 2002, is a 
consequence of the EU enlargement policy. Kaliningrad, the annexed part of the 
former East Prussia by the Soviet Union after the WWII, became an exclave of 
Russia surrounded by the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Lithuania after the collapse of the 
communist rule in Eastern Europe.214 Yet, after the entry of Poland and Lithuania to 
the EU, citizens of Kaliningrad will need visas to travel to homeland Russia, 
moreover Russian exclave will lose its economic value as formerly being a free-
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trade zone, since it will be excluded from the Common Market and Customs Union 
of the EU. However, parties still could not find a satisfactory way to solve this 
problem. In fact, the problem has two dimensions: 1) on the issue of movement of 
people and goods, Russian legal provisions are totally incompatible with those of the 
EU, 2) Russia finds assistance given to Kaliningrad, amounted 40 million euros, 
insufficient and tries to use the situation to try and win investments.215 Although 
negotiations continue on the future of the Kaliningrad district, even the way 
consultations conducted is promising for viewing the impacts of an institutionalized 
relationship. As one Russian political figure put it, compromise can be reached for 
Kaliningrad, if only because, European business has major long-term interests in 
Russia and the EU, itself, has an interest in political cooperation.216   
 Another area of tension is the discord in Russian and European approaches. 
The EU sees the true establishment of democratic institutions and rule of law as a 
prerequisite of the Russian development. The EU officials believe that, through this 
path, threat of an authoritarian and expansionist Russia will never again be a concern 
of Europe. Moreover, practically, commitment of the EU and European businessmen 
to the Russian economy necessitates legal guarantees compatible with those in the 
West. Thus, the EU insists on the completion of reforms in Russian political, 
economic, and legal systems. The EU even gave an ultimatum to Russia by stating 
that “either Russia becomes a more democratic state along Western lines or there 
will be less cooperation.”217   
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 On the other hand, Russian tendency is towards severing the political and 
legal pillars of the reforms from economic ones. Yet, as their economic 
interdependence becomes more profound, parties adopt more flexible policies. For 
instance, Russian legal system is under revision for 18 months, and Russian officials 
demonstrate the firm political will to develop and implement market reforms. Parallel 
to this mitigation, the EU officials changed their tone from giving ultimatums to such 
declarations: “we cannot and should not try to standardise every corner of Europe. It's 
not a matter of imposing EU legislation word for word on Russia but of offering a 
model for economic and legislative integration.”218     
  
E) CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 With regard to the discussion about the hierarchy between spheres of economy 
and politics, mutual economic interests and their exhaustion by building an 
interdependent relationship can be seen as key instruments to stimulate overlapping 
security aspirations. Yet, without a certain level of rapprochement, it is impossible to 
boost economic relations. It is the construction of a system of dialogue through 
economic interdependence that turns a ‘cold’ peace into a security partnership, even a 
security community. Economic interdependence affects the nature of the relationship 
indirectly, but profoundly. Once parties stop to see each other as threat or enemy, 
either due to lack of ideological confrontation or military capability, economic 
cooperation takes the stage to deepen the roots of partnership. In sum, there is no 
hierarchy between spheres of common economic and security interests, but rather a 
complex association. Understanding this association is important, since, if it is proved 
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to be valid in different cases, it may be seen as a formula for lasting peace.      
 For the Russian-EU case, chapter on security provides a further insight apart 
from the above discussion. Since parties are both face to face with new challenges and 
devoid of military means to cope with these threats, their security relationship is 
conducted only on the perceptional level. The EU with its economic power and 
Russia with its definition of economic development as one of its primary security 
objectives share a common ground. Hence, Europe has an influential role in Russian 
politics more than ever, and it is possible to change the historically based perceptions 
of the parties about each other due to this common economic ground.           
 








 This study has focused on the Russian-EU relationship by giving reference to 
two different domains, namely economy and security. Hence, main objective of this 
paper was not only to analyze the emerging association between Russia and the EU, 
but also to understand the link between these two domains. This specific relationship 
presented an interesting and valuable example both because of the historically, 
culturally, politically and economically effective roles of the parties and possibility 
to formulate the case as a model. Formulating a model for relationships labelled with 
long-lasting confrontation and perpetual threat of war, in fact, poses a theoretical 
question: liberal philosophy argues that it is possible to break down frozen bilateral 
perceptions via “economic integration ‘spilling over’ in political and eventually in 
security integration.”219 This formula served to Western Europe in formation of the 
EU and desecuritization of the policy agendas of the member states. Yet, the realist 
paradigm may raise up against this premise by giving the example of the Détente, in 
which a similar scenario had been experimented but failed because of the unsolved 
security concerns of the parties.  
  Despite the methodological constraints laid upon the subject matter, the 
conduct of this research put out some clear-cut answers to the questions posed in the 
first chapter.  First of all, Russia and the EU do not constitute threats for each other 
due to the facts of absence of ideological confrontation, lack or weakness of military 
capabilities of both sides, and convergence of their economic and political interests.  
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 Secondly, it is more than possible to define the economic interactions 
between the parties as economic interdependence. The Russian-EU economic 
partnership, despite its imbalance, fulfils the criteria determined for economic 
interdependence - institutional links, trade volume, vulnerability, shared goals. This 
relationship has been first framed by the 1994 Partnership Cooperation Agreement, 
and gradually institutionalized on a regular and multi-dimensional basis.  
 The EU is an indispensable economic ally for Russia due to its share in trade 
relations and technical assistance programs. The Union absorbs nearly 35 % of 
Russian exports and provides 25 % of its imports. The total EU assistance to Russia 
amounts € 2.281 billion in the period of 1991-2000. Moreover, the EU became the 
first country to grant Russia the fully fledged market economy status, which “will 
allow tariff-free sales of a broader range of Russian goods, provide greater 
protection against European anti-dumping laws, pave the way for Moscow’s long-
desired entry into the World Trade Organization.”220   
 From the viewpoint of the EU, it is important to have Russia as an 
economically stable partner. The EU is vulnerable to economic crisis in Russia 
because of its involvement in Russian economy in the form of economic assistance, 
loans and credits provided, and Russia’s role as an energy supplier and market for 
European consumer goods. Besides, the EU is also investing in its own future with 
regard to the enlargement process, which will turn Russia into the largest neighbor 
of the Union. Since an isolated and instable Russia may threaten the EU with its 
possible economic ills and dangers either stemming from or passing through Russian 
homeland, such as drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, environmental hazards or 
unsafe nuclear weapons.  
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 Briefly, Russia and the EU constructed an essential economic relationship 
that goes beyond cooperation. Yet, it is argued that the raison d’étre behind the 
creation of economic interdependence is of political origin. That is to say, 
flourishing the economic ties was not a spontaneous result of the relationship 
between the parties or a coincidence, but rather a chosen path to boost political and 
security cooperation in Europe. This is an act, rooted in the respective fears of the 
parties from their own pasts and the desire to guarantee stability and security for 
further economic and political development.    
 Third of the research questions interrogates the role of economic 
interdependence in easing tensions between the parties. Economic interdependence 
brought about two important outcomes: firstly, regular and intensive consultations 
introduced continuation and traditionalization to the relationship. Secondly, since 
interdependence ties the parties to each other with strong links, parties choose to 
compromise on their common problems instead of jeopardizing the relationship. 
That is to say, parties are building up a code of conduct, which needs to be tested 
with actual disagreements. Three spots of disagreement are summarized in Chapter 
III. Especially in the case of Chechnya, it is found out that the EU mitigated the tone 
of its opposition and tried to prevent the escalation of this problem. Yet, in order to 
make valid judgements about the future of Russian-EU relationship, other areas of 
tension should be resolved through consultation and compromise. The way the 
Kaliningrad Question is dealt with and how discord in approaches is overcome will 
be decisive on this partnership. 
 The fourth research question of this study is about the role of the ‘third 
variables,’ if there are any. Answer to this question is affirmative. In fact, there exist 
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two external factors, which affect the correlation between economic interdependence 
and easing political tensions. First one is a prerequisite for the model itself, whereas 
the second one is special to the Russian-EU case. The first one, which will be 
touched upon later in this chapter, is the absence of ideological confrontation. 
Accordingly, for economic interdependence to flourish, a historical level, at which 
seriousness or urgency of security concerns lessen, should be reached. Secondly, for 
this specific case, betterment of relations between Russia and the EU is bound to the 
character of the relationship between Russia and the U.S. Although the EU has 
different views on certain issues, it still needs the transatlantic link. Thus, Russia 
should not force the EU to make a preference by contradicting with the U.S. That is 
to say, the EU engages in economic and security cooperation with Russia more 
easily, if it does not feel like making a choice between Russia and the transatlantic 
alliance.  
 Last question of the list draws attention to the domain of security/politics: 
does security factor dominate the post-Cold War relations between Russia and the 
EU despite the growing economic interdependence between them? Both yes and no. 
 In order to explain the link between economic interdependence and security 
factor, an international security perspective with focus on traditional security traits is 
chosen by giving reference to perceptions, national interests, political will and 
military capabilities. To make the connection between the domains of economy and 
politics/security, a question is put forward: which one of these domains has the 
priority and influence to affect the other or is it possible to build on a political 
integration directly through economic rapprochement? This would also be the main 
question that is in charge of interrogating the liberal philosophy. Therefore, the 
Union’s and Russia’s security structures are explored.  
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 It is found out that despite its newly enriched substance, the EU is lacking 
the physical and operational capabilities. Yet, it is necessary for the member states to 
develop their joint capacity in order to unify separate and inefficiently managed 
defense budgets under one single organizational scheme, to avoid any further 
humiliations in the field of preserving the continental security, to guarantee the 
stability for international trade and investments, and to set up a legitimate role in 
world politics, especially for matters it does not share the U.S. stance.  
 From the Russian side, there exists a heavy security heritage, labelled with 
expansionism, high self-esteem, strong leadership and even authoritarianism, and 
fear of being sidelined or isolated. Moreover, Russia experienced an institutional 
duality during the demise of the Soviet Union and a debate on security identity, 
which resulted in a balanced position between integration with the West and Russian 
uniqueness. Similar to the European case, Russia, despite its continuing great power 
thinking, is devoid of the means and influence of what its political will necessitated. 
This gap between capacity and will is tried to be filled in by President Putin’s 
diplomatic efforts. These efforts are aimed at preserving Russia’s ‘vital interests,’ 
namely preventing any local conflicts inside Russia or in the Russian sphere of 
influence, achieving at economic might in order to re-establish its military 
capabilities relevant to the post-Cold War needs, and impeding any move towards a 
uni-polar world order. The most important of these national interests is the depiction 
of economic interests as an integral part of security structure. That is to say, any 
threat against Russian economic development would also be perceived as a pure 
security threat. This is one of the reasons for Russia’s attachment of so much 
importance to economic interdependence with the EU.  
 When one combines the perceptions, assessments and security plans of 
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Russia and the EU, it becomes apparent that they do not see each other as threats, 
furthermore they have overlapping interests in the field of security. It is possible for 
the parties to cooperate in crisis-management, peacekeeping operations, joint 
defense projects to secure peace on the continent, to build a multi-polar world order, 
and to legitimize their roles in macro-politics. However, it is not realistic to analyze 
the future of Russian-EU security cooperation without giving reference to the 
predominant US role through NATO in European security. Hence, the above-
mentioned prospects for the Russian-EU joint action are conditionally bound to the 
future Russian-NATO rapprochement.     
 On the question of hierarchy between the domains of economy and politics, 
it is relevant to make a conclusion as such: Russia and the EU made a policy choice 
for economic interdependence to establish foundations of a European peace 
tradition. Yet, this argumentation of direct and positive correlation between 
economic interdependence and betterment of political relations may seem over-
idealistic unless one puts the prerequisite for an initial improvement in security 
perceptions. More precisely, liberal philosophy may come true as a formula in the 
long-run, but only by rising up on the shoulders of the realist paradigm. 
 For the specific case of Russia and the EU, political rapprochement through 
economic partnership would be impossible whether ideological confrontation of the 
Cold War would not have ended. This version of liberal thinking was exemplified 
with the failure of the Détente due to clashes of interest. Thus, mitigation of urgent 
security concerns creates an appropriate environment for presence and spilling over 
of economic interdependence. That is to say, security factor, even with its absence, 
dominates the post-Cold War Russian-EU relations.  
 This paper concludes that economic interdependence and the liberal 
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philosophy behind it are useful instruments for establishing a tradition of dialogue, 
and easing the tensions between parties historically hostile to each other. Yet, for the 
sake of being down to earth, it is necessary to stress that such an influence of 
economic interdependence becomes lasting, if it is built upon a certain level of 
security. To view the correlation between economic interdependence and political 
rapprochement, one should neither underestimate nor exaggerate the power of 
economic domain. 
 This thesis focused on the EU-Russian relationship, which has recently 
flourished. Yet, further research should be conducted to see whether spots of 
disagreements can be solved by the mechanism parties established. In sum, as it is 
expressed at the 6th Russian-EU summit declaration, “conditions are favorable” for 
the strategic partnership. Both interests of the parties and the international context 
favor the Russian-EU relationship. Nevertheless, time will be decisive on this 
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